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Abstract
This paper develops an approach for quantifying the importance of different sources of comparative
advantage for country welfare. To explain patterns of specialization, I present a multi-country trade
model that extends Eaton and Kortum (2002) to predict industry trade flows. In this framework,
comparative advantage is determined by the interaction of country and industry characteristics, with
countries specializing in industries whose specific production needs they are best able to meet with their
factor endowments and institutional strengths. I estimate the model parameters on a large dataset
of bilateral trade flows, presenting results from both a baseline OLS approach, as well as a simulated
method of moments (SMM) procedure to account for the prevalence of zero trade flows in the data. I
apply the model to explore various quantitative questions, in particular how much distance, Ricardian
productivity, factor endowments, and institutional conditions each matter for country welfare in the
global trade equilibrium. I also illustrate the shift in industry composition and the accompanying
welfare gains in policy experiments where a country raises its factor endowments or improves the
quality of its institutions.
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1 Introduction
The concept of comparative advantage has been the basis of our understanding of the pattern of in-
ternational trade since David Ricardo articulated the key intuition almost two centuries ago. The past
few years have seen a much-needed resurgence in empirical work on sources of comparative advantage –
those forces, such as country differences in productivity or factor endowments, that determine patterns
of specialization and trade.
On the Ricardian model, it is only recently that Eaton and Kortum (2002) showed how one can derive
analytic expressions for trade flows in a general multi-country setting, by providing a parametrization
of the underlying distribution that governs country productivity levels. The good fit of their model
to the manufacturing trade data delivered an important piece of evidence on the role of productivity
differences in determining comparative advantage (Eaton and Kortum 2002, Costinot and Komunjer
2007).1 Separately, several studies have reaffirmed the role of factor endowments for explaining trade
patterns within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. These have shown that countries tend to be net exporters
of their relatively abundant factors in North-South bilateral trade (Debaere 2003), and that countries
also export more in industries that use these abundant factors more intensively (Romalis 2004).2 Moving
beyond this neoclassical focus, a recent cluster of work has identified how country institutions can augment
productivity, particularly in industries that are dependent on these institutional provisions to facilitate
production. Such institutional sources of comparative advantage include: financial development (Beck
2003, Manova 2006), the security of contract enforcement (Levchenko 2007, Nunn 2007, Costinot 2007),
and labor market flexibility (Cun˜at and Melitz 2007).3
This paper develops a methodology for quantifying the importance of these various sources of compar-
ative advantage for country welfare in a global trade equilibrium. As a benchmark structural framework,
I present an extension of the Eaton-Kortum (EK) model that goes beyond aggregate trade volumes to
explain the cross-country pattern of specialization and industry trade flows. In the model, the pro-
ductivity level of firms is composed of a systematic and a stochastic component, where the systematic
component is driven by the interaction between country and industry characteristics. The motivation for
this is intuitive: Industries vary in the technological and institutional conditions needed for production,
1Ricardian models of an earlier vintage, such as Dornbusch et al. (1977), could not easily be taken to empirical work,
largely because these were two-country models featuring complete specialization (each good exported by precisely one
country), which is clearly inconsistent with the large volume of intra-industry trade observed in practice. Most earlier studies
instead tested more reduced-form Ricardian implications, such as whether countries tend to export more in industries where
domestic productivity is higher, without a full theoretical model in mind. For a review of this earlier empirical work, see
Section 3 of Deardorff’s (1984) Handbook chapter; for a more recent example, see Golub and Hsieh (2000).
2While these studies focus on the correlation between relative factor endowments and trade patterns, there is a related
vast literature seeking to explain the absolute levels of the factor content of trade. A key puzzle here was the paradox of
the “missing trade” – the troubling finding that the factor content of observed trade is vastly smaller than that predicted
from countries’ endowments by the Vanek equations (Trefler 1995).
3Strictly speaking, these institutional explanations of trade flows can be viewed as a subset of the Ricardian model,
insofar as the mechanism through which institutions operate is to boost domestic productivity in specific industries.
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and countries differ in their ability to provide for these industry-specific requirements. Comparative
advantage therefore stems in practice from such country-industry matches.
At heart, this empirical specification draws on existing work that identifies comparative advantage
from such interactions between country and industry characteristics. Romalis (2004) applied this logic to
test for Heckscher-Ohlin forces: By interacting countries’ relative factor abundance with an industry mea-
sure of factor intensities in production, he showed that countries capture a larger US import market share
in industries that use their abundant factors more intensively.4 The literature on institutional determi-
nants of trade has also adopted this empirical strategy, by applying or constructing novel measures of an
industry’s dependence on particular institutional conditions. Beck (2003) and Manova (2006) interacted
country measures of private credit availability with an industry measure of external capital dependence,
to show that countries with better financial development export more in industries that rely heavily on
external financing.5 Similarly, several studies have shown that countries with better institutional rule of
law export relatively more in industries that are more exposed to holdup problems or other institutional
frictions, as measured by input concentration (Levchenko 2007), the share of customized inputs (Nunn
2007), or job task complexity (Costinot 2007).6 Cun˜at and Melitz (2007) have also demonstrated that
countries with flexible labor markets facilitate specialization in more volatile industries, as these are the
industries that benefit most from being able to adjust employment margins regularly.
The model that I present in Section 2 provides a structural interpretation for the estimation be-
ing performed in this burgeoning literature on sources of comparative advantage, by embedding these
specifications within the multi-country, general equilibrium setting of the EK model. Conveniently, the
model delivers an analytic expression for trade flows at the industry level that resembles a gravity equa-
tion, and which also incorporates a role for distance barriers, Heckscher-Ohlin forces, and institutional
determinants in explaining trade volumes. The theory can thus be readily taken to the data.
Section 3 estimates the closed-form trade flow expressions using ordinary least-squares (OLS) meth-
ods, to provide a first-pass test of the model. For the empirical implementation, I assembled a large
dataset of bilateral industry trade flows, pairwise distance measures, as well as country and industry
characteristics for a sample of 83 countries and 20 manufacturing industries. This includes a compre-
hensive set of all the country-industry interaction terms from the papers cited above, which facilitates a
comparison with the results in the existing literature. Here, I find strong corroborating evidence for the
4See Baldwin (1971, 1979) for early work on the industry-level correlation between factor intensities and net exports.
5This draws on the empirical strategy in Rajan and Zingales (1998), who showed that countries with better financial
development experienced higher growth rates in industries that are more dependent on external financing. The relationship
between financial development and trade has also been explored by Beck (2002), Wynne (2005), Svaleryd and Vlachos
(2005), Hur et al. (2006), and Becker and Greenberg (2007). For related theoretical work, see Kletzer and Bardhan (1987),
and Matsuyama (2005).
6The effects of the institutional rule of law on trade flows have also been investigated by Anderson and Marcouillier (2002),
Berkowitz et al. (2006), and Ranjan and Lee (2007). For theoretical work formalizing the role of contract enforcement as a
source of comparative advantage in an incomplete contracts framework, see Acemoglu et al. (2007).
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importance of factor endowments, financial development, legal institutions, and labor market regimes as
sources of comparative advantage, even when all interaction terms are run in one regression. This repre-
sents a first exercise (to the best of my knowledge) at jointly verifying the significance of this extensive
a list of institutional determinants of trade from prior studies.
While OLS provides a useful baseline, it suffers from the drawback that zero trade observations
are dropped when log trade flows are the dependent variable. These zeros constitute about two-thirds
of the dataset, and discarding this sizeable amount of information can systematically bias the OLS
coefficients (see Santos-Silva and Tenreyro 2006 and Helpman et al. 2007, among others).7 It would thus
be important to first account for these zeros. To this end, I modify the model in Section 4 to generate zero
trade predictions. I impose a bounded support on the distribution that governs the stochastic component
of productivity, so that a country with a low systematic productivity level may nevertheless never receive
a large enough productivity shock to be able to export a good to a given market. This is a natural
step in keeping with the Ricardian spirit of the model, since it attributes the zeros to large cross-country
productivity gaps. It does however lead to a complication, which is that we no longer have explicit closed-
form expressions for trade flows. I therefore pursue a simulated method of moments (SMM) procedure
to obtain an independent set of parameter estimates, by matching key statistical moments in the actual
data with those from trade flows simulated from the model (Pakes and Pollard 1989).
Using these SMM estimates, I explore the quantitative implications of the model for the global trade
equilibrium in Section 5. A first set of counterfactual exercises relates to distance and geography. The
model implies a sizeable average increase in country welfare (15.7%) from a hypothetical move to a world
where measures of distance barriers are minimized, comparable to what EK (2002) find for their OECD
sample (16.1%-24.1%). The transition path itself reveals interesting patterns: An initial reduction in
distance favors existing producer countries in each industry, raising the concentration of the location of
production. Only as barriers are reduced more substantially do new countries emerge as viable exporters,
eventually lowering the concentration of production location below the status quo level.
Second, the structural framework allows us to assess the relative importance of the various sources
of comparative advantage for country welfare. I do so by shutting down country-by-country the relevant
terms in the empirical model that capture each of these comparative advantage forces. The calculations
indicate that within the context of this model, Ricardian forces, Heckscher-Ohlin forces, and distance
barriers are almost equally important from a welfare perspective: The average country welfare loss from
shutting off either the Ricardian or the Heckscher-Ohlin terms lies in the same ballpark (−36.6% and
−34.5% respectively), and this is similar to the welfare loss (−37.8%) when raising the distance markup
7Haveman and Hummels (2004) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) point out that traditional formulations of the
gravity equation are inconsistent with the presence of zeros in the trade data. EK (2002) were not affected by this since
their dataset of aggregate OECD manufacturing trade flows contains no zeros.
4
country-by-country to the maximum level in the sample. The institutional determinants of trade, which
are strictly speaking a subset of the Ricardian forces, also play a substantial role. Legal institutions
feature prominently here, with welfare suffering the most when the channels from Levchenko (2007) and
Nunn (2007) related to how the contracting environment alleviates holdup problems are shut down.
Last but not least, the model can be readily applied to consider country policy experiments. For
example, several developing countries have in recent years pursued concerted policies of capital accu-
mulation to expand their exports and thereby promote growth, and it would be interesting to evaluate
the consequences of such policy moves. To this end, I examine policy shocks to an illustrative large
developing country (Indonesia). I demonstrate the underlying shift in industry structure and the ensuing
welfare gains from such changes as an increase in factor endowments or an improvement in domestic
institutions.
This paper falls within a broader research agenda seeking to quantify the importance of different
determinants of trade flows, often by developing variants of the traditional gravity equation. Such models
have been used to evaluate various welfare counterfactuals, to quantify the effects of moving towards a
zero-gravity world (Eaton and Kortum 2002), border effects (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003), and tariff
liberalization (Lai and Trefler 2002, Lai and Zhu 2004, Alvarez and Lucas 2007).8 While the methodology
developed in this paper facilitates similar distance-related exercises, it further enables the researcher to
explore policy experiments involving country characteristics that matter for comparative advantage, to
examine the subsequent impact on industry structure, trade patterns and welfare.
This paper is also related to several recent studies which have sought to take a more holistic view
on sources of comparative advantage by incorporating both Ricardian and Hescksher-Ohlin forces in
empirical work, in order to better account for the determinants of trade flows at the industry level
(Harrigan 1997, Morrow 2008).9 A close paper along these lines is Shikher (2007), who develops an
alternative extension of the EK model to explain industry trade flows. Empirically, Shikher calibrates
country-industry technology parameters in order to fit the output and trade data, whereas the approach
that I take here will instead be to relate these productivity parameters to observable country and industry
characteristics.
In terms of empirical machinery, SMM methods have previously been applied to estimate the struc-
tural parameters of various versions of the EK model (Bernard et al. 2003, Eaton et al. 2005). The
specific approach in this paper is most similar to Ramondo (2008), who employed an SMM procedure to
8Lai and Trefler (2002) and Lai and Zhu (2004) worked with a model of monopolistic competition, in contrast to the
perfectly-competitive framework in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Of note, Lai and Trefler (2002)
expressed a healthy reservation about the counterfactuals they computed, as they documented several dimensions, such as
the implied price elasticities, along which their model appears misspecified.
9In the same spirit, Davis and Weinstein (2001) found that allowing for productivity differences across countries in the
traditional Vanek equations was one way to reduce the extent of the “missing trade” paradox.
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estimate a structural model of multinational activity in a manner consistent with the prevalence of zeros.
At this juncture, it is useful to note that the methodology developed here in this paper is in fact very
general and is clearly not limited to the specific set of interactions that I consider. Any relevant country
and industry variables that jointly affect the pattern of trade can in principle be included, subject to the
caveat that this will raise computational cost for the SMM estimation.
The roadmap for the paper is as follows. Section 2 extends the canonical EK model to explain industry
trade flows. Section 3 presents the baseline results from estimating the derived trade flow equations via
OLS. I modify the model in Section 4 to account for the zero trade flows, and re-estimate it with the SMM
procedure. I assess the fit of the model to the actual data on several dimensions, including the implied
country GDP levels and predicted trade flows in the global trade equilibrium. Section 5 explores various
welfare counterfactuals. Section 6 concludes. Details on the data are documented in the Appendix.
2 A Benchmark Model of Industry Trade Flows
2.1 The basic setup
Consider a world with n = 1, . . . , N countries. There are K industries, indexed by k = 0, 1, . . . ,K.
Industry 0 denotes non-tradables, which is a homogenous good sector. The tradable sectors (k ≥ 1)
are differentiated products industries, where the continuum of varieties in each industry is indexed by
jk ∈ [0, 1]. (The measure of varieties in each industry is normalized to 1.) I proceed to build the model
in stages.
Utility: The utility of a representative consumer in country n is given by:
Un =
(
Q0n
)1−η∑
k≥1
(∫ 1
0
(Qkn(j
k))α djk
) β
α

η
β
, α, β, η ∈ (0, 1) (1)
where Qkn(j
k) denotes the quantity of variety jk from industry k consumed in country n. (In what follows,
I suppress the superscript k for varieties unless there is cause for confusion.) Utility from tradables is
aggregated via a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Define ε = 1/(1− α) > 1 to
be the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties from the same industry, and φ = 1/(1−β) > 1
to be the corresponding elasticity between varieties drawn from different industries. I assume that ε > φ,
so that varieties from the same industry are closer substitutes than varieties from different industries.
Total utility is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over the consumption of tradables and non-tradables, with the
share of income spent on tradables equal to η ∈ (0, 1).
The representative consumer in country n maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint:
Q0n +
∑
k≥1
(∫ 1
0
pkn(j)Q
k
n(j) dj
)
= Yn (2)
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where Yn is total income in country n, and pkn(j) is the price in country n of variety j from industry k. (The
non-tradable good is the domestic numeraire.) Solving this optimization program, it is straightforward
to show that the demand for each tradable variety is:
Qkn(j) =
ηYn (P kn )
ε−φ∑
κ≥1(P κn )1−φ
pkn(j)
−ε, k ≥ 1 (3)
where (P kn )
1−ε =
∫ 1
0 (p
k
n(j))
1−εdj is the ideal price index for industry k faced by consumers in country
n. The demand for the homogenous good is simply Q0n = (1 − η)Yn, since consumers spend a fraction
(1− η) of income on this outside good.
Goods Prices: The market for each variety is perfectly competitive. Firms undertake production
using a constant returns to scale technology, so all firms price at average cost. (There are no fixed costs
of entry or production.) Consider the market for supplying an industry-k variety (k ≥ 1) to country n.
All N countries in the world are potential producers of this variety. Following EK’s notation, let pkni(j)
denote the price that country i would charge for exporting variety j to country n (the first subscript, ‘n’,
identifies the importing country, while the second subscript, ‘i’, refers to the exporter). We have:
pkni(j) =
cki d
k
ni
zki (j)
(4)
Here, cki is the unit production cost of the prospective exporter (country i) in industry k, while d
k
ni ≥ 1
denotes the iceberg transport cost incurred due to distance or geographic barriers. The zki (j) terms
capture the Ricardian productivity of country i in the manufacture of variety j; formally, zki (j) is equal
to the number of units of variety j that country i can produce using the same bundle of factors that
would produce one unit under the baseline technology.
It is convenient to specify the unit production cost, cki , to be a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over factor
prices in country i, namely: cki =
∏F
f=0(wif )
skf , where f = 0, 1, . . . , F indexes factors of production.10
wif is the local unit price of factor f , while skf ∈ (0, 1) is the share of total factor payments in industry
k that accrues to this factor. Under constant returns to scale, we have:
∑F
f=0 s
k
f = 1. Each firm takes
the wif ’s as given, being too small to affect aggregate factor markets. These factor price terms capture
the role of Heckscher-Ohlin forces, namely endowment-based production cost differences, in influencing
trade patterns. Note that the model does not in general imply factor price equalization across countries
due to the presence of productivity differences and transport cost barriers.
For the distance markup, I further assume that dkni ≤ dknn′dkn′i for any three countries n, n′ and i,
so that it is cheaper to transport goods directly between two countries, rather than through a third
country. I allow the iceberg cost to vary by industry, since some goods may be more costly to transport,
for reasons such as heavier tonnage or industry-specific tariffs.
10As is well known, this is the unit cost function that emerges from the cost minimization problem when the production
technology is Cobb-Douglas in the inputs, with factor shares equal to skf .
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Productivity: In order to relate productivity to observable characteristics, I specify the log produc-
tivity of country i in industry-k varieties to be:
ln zki (j) = λi + µk +
∑
{l,m}
βlmLilMkm + β0ki (j) (5)
Productivity is thus composed of: (i) a systematic component, λi+µk +
∑
{l,m} βlmLilMkm, that linearly
shifts the average log productivity level of country i in this industry; and (ii) a stochastic term, β0ki (j),
that generates idiosyncratic variation in productivity across varieties. While country i may on average
be less productive than other exporters, it may nevertheless be the most productive exporter in those
varieties for which it receives a good stochastic shock. The spread parameter β0 therefore plays a key
role in regulating the variance of these productivity shocks.
The systematic component of productivity is driven by a linear combination of country characteristics
(Lil, indexed by l) and industry characteristics (Mkm, indexed by m). This embeds the idea that it
is precisely the interaction between pairs {l,m} of country and industry attributes that determines a
country’s productivity position in that industry. For example, countries where legal institutions securely
enforce contracts will on average be more productive in industries that are more vulnerable to holdup
problems between input suppliers and producers (Levchenko 2007, Nunn 2007). These LilMkm interaction
terms will serve primarily to capture the role of institutional determinants of the pattern of trade, with the
βlm coefficients parameterizing how important each institutional channel is for generating a productivity
edge. Note that exporter and industry fixed effects (λi and µk) are also included to control for the average
productivity level across all countries and industries respectively.
As for the stochastic component of productivity, the ki (j)’s are independent draws from the Type I
extreme-value (Gumbel) distribution, with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F () = exp(− exp(−)).
This is the natural counterpart to EK’s specification of a Fre´chet distribution for productivity levels,
since the natural log of a Fre´chet random variable inherits a Gumbel distribution.11 This probability
specification facilitates a closed-form expression for trade flows, in much the same way that it delivers
an explicit formula for product market shares in discrete choice models in industrial organization.
Substituting (5) into (4), the price presented by country i to country n for variety j in industry k is:
ln pkni(j) = ln(c
k
i d
k
ni)− λi − µk −
∑
{l,m}
βlmLilMkm − β0ki (j) (6)
Not surprisingly, prices are increasing in unit production costs (cki ) and transport costs (d
k
ni), but a
country’s productivity position in variety j potentially lowers the price that it charges.
11The micro-foundation that EK offer for this distributional choice thus carries over to this extension: Suppose that firm
productivity levels within a country follow a Pareto distribution, an assumption that finds good support in the data (for
example, see Helpman et al. 2004). Then, the order statistic for the maximum productivity level across all firms (hence
the technological frontier of the country) is a Fre´chet random variable. Costinot and Komunjer (2007) show that this
distributional choice for the productivity shocks can be relaxed to some extent. In an earlier draft, Costinot (2007) also
independently recognized this way of extending the EK model to the industry level.
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The distribution of the ki (j)’s gives rise to a distribution of prices, G
k
ni(p), presented by country i to
country n for each industry-k variety. Using the Gumbel cdf in (6), it follows that:
Gkni(p) = Prob{pkni(j) < p} = 1− exp{−(cki dkni)−θpθϕki } (7)
where θ = 1β0 and ϕ
k
i = exp {θλi + θµk + θ
∑
{l,m} βlmLilMkm}. Note that θ has the interpretation of an
inverse productivity spread parameter. Also, ϕki is increasing in the systematic component of country i’s
productivity in industry k.12
2.2 Implications for trade flows
The remaining steps derive a closed-form expression for trade flows following EK (2002) closely. Countries
procure each variety from the lowest-price provider, giving rise to the possibility of cross-border trade.
Let pkn(j) = min{pkni(j) : i = 1, . . . , N} be the price actually paid by country n for variety j from industry
k. The industry-k price distribution facing country n (denoted by Gkn) is therefore given by:
Gkn(p) = 1−
N∏
i=1
[1−Gkni(p)] = 1− exp{−(
N∑
i=1
(cki d
k
ni)
−θϕki )p
θ} (8)
Also, let pikni be the probability of country i being the lowest-price provider – and hence the unique
exporter – of an industry-k variety to country n.13 We have:
pikni =
∫ ∞
0
∏
s 6=i
[1−Gkns(p)] dGkni(p) =
(cki d
k
ni)
−θϕki∑N
s=1(cksdkns)−θϕks
(9)
We can now aggregate across varieties in an industry to derive trade flows. Denote by Xkni the value
of industry-k exports from country i to n, with Xkn =
∑N
i=1X
k
ni being country n’s total consumption in
this industry. It follows that:
Xkni
Xkn
=
pikni
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0 p
k
n(j)Q
k
n(j) dj dG
k
n(p
k
n)∑N
i=1 pi
k
ni
∫∞
0
∫ 1
0 p
k
n(j)Qkn(j) dj dGkn(pkn)
= pikni =
(cki d
k
ni)
−θϕki∑N
s=1(cksdkns)−θϕks
(10)
Observe that to evaluate the total value of industry-k consumption in country n in the denominator,
I integrate over varieties j and the minimum price distribution, Gkn. As pointed out by EK (2002), it
can be shown that the distribution of prices in country n conditional on country i being the minimum
price provider is given once again by Gkn; since this conditional price distribution does not depend on
the identity of the exporting country (i), it follows that the fraction of total expenditure in industry k
spent on imports from country i is precisely pikni. This implies the closed-form (10), which expresses i’s
12It is possible to allow θ to vary by industry, so that the productivity distribution in each industry has a different variance,
but this will come at the cost of additional parameters to estimate.
13I assume that there are no ties so that there is a unique lowest-price provider for each variety. Since the stochastic
terms, ki (j), are independent draws across varieties, both the price distribution, G
k
n(p), and this probability, pi
k
ni, do not
vary across varieties in the industry.
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industry-k market share in country n as a function of underlying country and industry characteristics,
as well as bilateral distance.
It is instructive to re-express (10) by normalizing it with respect to country n’s expenditure share
from a fixed reference country, u:
Xkni
Xknu
=
(cki d
k
ni)
−θϕki
(ckudknu)−θϕku
(11)
This last equation has an intuitive interpretation: Country i’s market share in country n (normal-
ized by the market share of the reference country u) is decreasing in both i’s relative unit cost of
production (cki /c
k
u) and in the relative bilateral distance barrier (d
k
ni/d
k
nu). Conversely, country i’s mar-
ket share rises in i’s productivity edge in that industry (ϕki /ϕ
k
u). As for the role played by the in-
verse spread parameter, θ, observe that (11) can be rewritten as: X
k
ni
Xknu
=
(
cki d
k
ni/ϕ˜
k
i
ckud
k
nu/ϕ˜
k
u
)−θ
, where ϕ˜ki =
exp {λi + µk +
∑
{l,m} βlmLilMkm}. It is convenient to interpret (cki dkni/ϕ˜ki ) as an “average” price for
industry-k varieties exported from i to n. Now, suppose for example that this “average” price is higher
for exporter i than for u, so that i exports less to market n than the reference country (X
k
ni
Xknu
< 1). Now,
a lower θ will raise X
k
ni
Xknu
, so a larger spread in the productivity shocks shifts market shares in favor of
the initially smaller exporting countries. This feature stems from the fact that the Gumbel distribution
has a thick right tail: A large spread parameter (low θ) increases the likelihood that a country with
low systematic productivity will nevertheless get a good enough productivity shock in some varieties to
emerge as the lowest-price provider.
Comparison with Eaton and Kortum (2002): At this juncture, it is useful to highlight the close
links between the expressions for trade flows and those in EK (2002). To recapitulate, EK develop a
model of aggregate trade flows in which the exporter i productivity terms, zi(j), are independent draws
from a Fre´chet distribution, with cdf Fi(z) = exp(−Tizθ). Note that Ti > 0 is a country-specific location
parameter that reflects the technological position of the country, and θ > 1 is an inverse spread parameter
for the zi(j)’s. (The industry superscripts no longer apply.) A similar derivation now yields the following
expression for the share of n’s expenditure that is imported from country i, which is precisely equation
(10) in EK: (
Xni
Xn
)EK
=
(cidni)−θTi∑N
s=1(csdns)−θTs
(12)
It follows that trade flows normalized with respect to the reference country u are:(
Xni
Xnu
)EK
=
(cidni)−θTi
(cudnu)−θTu
(13)
These are clearly direct analogues of equations (10) and (11) in this paper: Both pairs of equations
explain trade shares as a function of factor costs, distance barriers, and productivity in a similar way,
except that each term has now been replaced with its industry-specific counterpart. In particular, the
more general productivity term, ϕki , takes the place of EK’s technological parameter, Ti. This highlights
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the sense in which this paper unpacks sources of Ricardian comparative advantage, by positing a func-
tional form for ϕki that relates productivity to observable characteristics to reflect how well countries are
able to meet the requirements of industries along various technological and institutional dimensions.
I defer to Section 4 the discussion of how to close the model formally to solve for country income
levels as an endogenous outcome of the global trade equilibrium. Instead, I focus first on estimating the
parameters of the model.
3 OLS Estimation of Model of Bilateral Industry Trade Flows
I present the OLS baseline estimates in this section. It turns out that the regression specifications for
trade flows implied by (10) resemble closely those in existing empirical work, and so the OLS results
provide a basis for comparison and corroboration with the current literature on sources of comparative
advantage. In addition, the regressions I run represent a first attempt (to the best of my knowledge) at
jointly testing the significance of such a comprehensive list of institutional determinants of trade flows.
These OLS coefficients provide a baseline against which to compare the SMM estimates later in Section
4, where we will deal with the potential bias from the omission of the zero trade flows.
3.1 Deriving the estimating equation
I need first to specify the empirical counterparts for several variables in the model. Following the extensive
literature on gravity equation estimation, I write the distance markup between any country pair to be a
log-linear function of observable distance measures:
dkni = exp{βdDni + δk + ζni + νkni} (14)
Here, βdDni is a linear combination of distance variables that impose an iceberg transport cost on
trade. In the empirical implementation below, these Dni’s will include physical distance, and indicator
variables for shared linguistic ties, colonial links, border relationships, as well as trade agreements that
reduce policy barriers to trade.14 The distance markup is allowed to vary by industry through the fixed
effect, δk, since transport costs may vary with the nature of the goods being shipped. Finally, trade
between countries may be subject to idiosyncratic shocks, ζni + νkni, which include a country-pair specific
component (ζni); I assume that these are iid draws from mean-zero normal distributions: ζni ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ),
and νkni ∼ N(0, σ2ν).
Substituting this distance term (14) into (10), and making use of the fact that sk0 = 1−
∑F
f=1 s
k
f , it
14See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for a survey of the many bilateral variables commonly used to capture trade
costs in gravity equations.
11
is straightforward to derive the following:
ln(Xkni) = −θ
F∑
f=1
(
ln
wif
wi0
)
skf + θ
∑
{l,m}
βlmLilMkm − θβdDni + Ii + Ink − θζni − θνkni (15)
Note that all the terms specific to the exporting country i (namely λi) have been collected in an exporter
fixed effect, Ii. Likewise, all the terms specific to each n-k pair have been collected in a corresponding
importer-industry fixed effect, Ink.
In practice, since good data on factor prices is not readily available for a large sample of countries,
I proxy for relative factor prices, ln wifwi0 , by treating them as an inverse function of relative factor en-
dowments, ln VifVi0 , where Vif denotes country i’s endowment of factor f .
15 This leads to the estimating
equation:
ln(Xkni) =
F∑
f=1
θβf
(
ln
Vif
Vi0
)
skf + θ
∑
{l,m}
βlmLilMkm − θβdDni + Ii + Ink − θζni − θνkni (16)
I therefore regress log bilateral industry trade flows, ln(Xkni), as a function of: (i) Heckscher-Ohlin forces,
as picked up by the interaction between country factor endowments,
(
ln VifVi0
)
, and industry factor inten-
sities, skf ; (ii) institutional forces, through the interaction between country institutional characteristics,
Lil, and industry measures of dependence, Mkm; (iii) bilateral distance variables, Dni; (iv) exporter
fixed effects, Ii; and (v) importer-industry fixed effects, Ink. Standard errors are clustered by country
pair, to allow for correlated shocks among observations from the same country pair (−θζni). Equation
(16) thus provides a neat decomposition of the determinants of trade flows, which embeds the empirical
specifications in Romalis (2004) and the recent literature on institutional determinants of trade flows.
(The θβf
(
ln VifVi0
)
skf and θLilMkm terms on the right-hand side are essentially similar in spirit, in that
both capture how well conditions in country i provide for the production needs of industry k.)
3.2 Discussion of OLS regression results
The empirical implementation uses a large dataset of bilateral trade flows, distance measures, and coun-
try and industry characteristics. The sample consists of 83 countries, listed in Table 1A, the largest
number for which I could assemble a balanced dataset of all the country variables. For the differentiated
products industries (k ≥ 1), I work with the US 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC-87) 2-digit
manufacturing categories, a fairly broad level of industry aggregation. This provides 20 industry groups,
listed in Table 1B, with SIC codes from 20 (food processing) to 39 (miscellaneous manufacturing). The
15Deardorff (1982) provided a very general proof that there is a negative correlation between factor prices and the factor
content of net exports. This helps justify substituting for factor prices as an inverse function of country factor endowments,
insofar as the factor content of net exports is positively correlated with endowments. On this latter point, Debaere (2003)
provided supporting evidence that countries are indeed net exporters of their relatively abundant factors in the case of
North-South bilateral trade, and in trade between countries with very different endowment mixes.
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analysis focuses on one year, 1990, the same year as in EK. This therefore abstracts from dynamic issues
such as factor accumulation over time.
The trade data are from Feenstra et al. (2005)’s World Trade Flows database. The original data
are in the Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2 format. I convert this to SIC-87
format using detailed information on the composition of US exports to derive concordance weights.16
As for the country and industry characteristics, these were drawn directly from or constructed following
closely the methodology of existing studies, in order to facilitate comparison with the literature. The
Data Appendix documents the details on the data sources, as well as how I standardized the relevant
variables into the common SIC-87 2-digit format. As far as possible, I use data from the immediate years
preceding 1990. When multiple years are available, I use averages over 1980-89 to help smooth out the
data from any single year. (Summary statistics of the industry and country variables, including means
and pairwise correlations, are in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.)
The sample of 83 countries comprises 82.4% of all recorded manufacturing trade in 1990. While the
total number of data points is 83× 82× 20 = 136, 120, only 45,034 (or 33.1%) of these contain a positive
amount of trade. This pervasiveness of zeros is a major feature the bilateral trade data and it presents a
challenge to consistent estimation of gravity equations, since the zeros are dropped from the regression
sample when the dependent variable is log trade flows. The OLS results thus have to be interpreted
strictly as estimates conditional on observing a positive trade flow. I return to this issue of correcting
for the bias from discarding the zeros in the SMM estimation in Section 4.
Table 2 presents the baseline OLS regressions of (16), where the explanatory variables are introduced
in turn. The recent literature, including Romalis (2004) and the papers on institutions and trade, each
work with trade data that is concorded in different formats, at varying levels of aggregation. Table 2
thus verifies that the patterns identified in this preceding literature are also present in the dataset used
here, which works with bilateral trade flows at the relatively coarse 2-digit level of industry aggregation.
Distance: Column (1) reports a basic specification that includes standard measures of trade barriers
(Dni) from the gravity equation literature. The OLS coefficients generally confirm the importance of
distance in explaining trade patterns, although not all are statistically significantly. Of note, physical
distance has a negative and significant effect (βd1 = −1.152) in impeding trade flows, the magnitude of
which implies large effects: A hypothetical halving of physical distance would slightly more than double
the volume of bilateral trade, raising it by a factor of (0.5)−1.152 = 2.22. Sharing a common language
(βd2) or colonial ties (βd3) both raise the propensity for trade between countries. While the border effect
(βd4) is positive, this is not statistically significant. I also include two commonly-used dummy variables
to capture aspects of trade policy. Joint membership in an RTA (βd5) delivers a statistically significant
16This procedure follows Cun˜at and Melitz (2007), with the composition of US exports calculated from Feenstra et al.
(2002). Please see the Data Appendix for details.
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boost to bilateral trade. However, I do not find a significant GATT effect (βd6) with OLS (Rose 2004).
These distance coefficients remain remarkably stable even as more explanatory variables are included in
subsequent specifications.
Heckscher-Ohlin: Column (2) demonstrates the relevance of Heckscher-Ohlin forces for the cross-
country pattern of trade. Here, country measures of factor endowments per worker (log(H/L)i and
log(K/L)i for human and physical capital respectively) are interacted with industry measures of factor
intensity, where the latter are captured by the log factor usage per worker in the industry in question
(log(H/L)k and log(K/L)k).17 I find that countries which are more skill abundant do indeed exhibit
higher volumes of bilateral exports in more skill-intensive industries. Similarly, countries which have
more physical capital per worker tend to export more in capital-intensive industries (βf1 = 4.148 and
βf2 = 0.056, both significant at the 1% level). These echo the findings in Romalis (2004).
Institutional determinants: The rest of Table 2 finds broad support for the hypotheses on insti-
tutional sources of comparative advantage advanced recently. Column (3) examines the role of country
financial development, captured by the ratio of private credit to GDP in the economy (FINDEV ).
This is interacted against a measure of industry dependence on external finance (CAPDEP ), calculated
following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998). I obtain a positive and highly significant coeffi-
cient on this interaction term (βlm1), confirming that financially-developed countries are more successful
exporters in industries that depend more on external capital funding (Beck 2003, Manova 2006).
The next few columns turn to the role of the contracting and legal environment in facilitating produc-
tion. Levchenko (2007) argued that industries that rely heavily on a few key inputs are more vulnerable to
holdup problems from suppliers, and are hence more dependent on the legal system to enforce contracts.
Column (4) examines this mechanism by interacting a Herfindahl index of input-use concentration in
each industry (HI) against a measure of the strength of legal systems in each country (LEGAL). The
positive and significant coefficient obtained (βlm2) suggests that countries with stronger legal systems are
in a better position to specialize in goods with a high input concentration.18 Expanding on this incom-
plete contracting logic, Nunn (2007) developed a more refined measure of the extent to which holdup
problems affect production, calculated as the share of inputs that are classified as relationship-specific
(RS). The interaction between this industry measure with the country variable LEGAL yields a positive
and significant effect (βlm3), providing further confirmation of the importance of contracting institutions
in facilitating specialization and exports in contract-dependent industries.19 On a related note, Costinot
17I use this measure of industry factor intensities, instead of factor payment shares, as the former measure accounts for
more of the variance in the trade data (in terms of regression R2).
18The LEGAL measure used here is for the year 1985, taken from the Economic Freedom around the World reports
(Gwartney and Lawson 2004). Another popular index of institutional strength, from the World Bank Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann et al. 2005), is available only from 1996 onwards. The results are similar if I use their “rule of law” index for
1996, which likely reflects the high persistence in institutional conditions over time in most countries.
19The results are similar under the various alternative ways of classifying relationship-specific inputs discussed in Nunn
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(2007) proposed a different channel through which legal institutions can matter, by providing a con-
tracting environment that facilitates the division of labor among work teams. It is argued in particular
that frictions impeding the division of labor have more adverse productivity effects on industries where
job tasks are more complex (COMPL). Column (5) demonstrates that this logic appears relevant for
explaining trade patterns, as countries with stronger institutions do indeed export more in complex in-
dustries (βlm4). As in Costinot (2007), I also find that countries with a higher skill endowment are
better-placed to export in more complex industries (βlm5), suggesting that skilled workers are indeed
able to perform complex tasks more efficiently.
The final column in Table 2 considers the effect of labor market institutions. Consistent with Cun˜at
and Melitz (2007), I obtain a positive coefficient (βlm6 significant at the 1% level) indicating that coun-
tries with flexible labor institutions (FLEX) do export more in industries that experience greater sales
volatility (SV OL); these are precisely the industries that rely most on being able to adjust employment
to respond to changing market conditions.
Full model: All the above conclusions remain intact when I run these institutional determinants
jointly in a single specification, as evidenced by Table 3, Column (1). In particular, all of the interaction
terms capturing Heckscher-Ohlin and institutional determinants are statistically significant, suggesting
that the empirical literature has to date successfully identified largely independent channels through
which country attributes influence the pattern of trade. To provide a gauge of the relative importance
of these explanatory variables, Column (1a) reports the standardized beta coefficients based on the
specification in Column (1).20 Physical distance is not surprisingly the most influential distance variable
(beta coefficient, βd1 = −0.31). That said, the Heckscher-Ohlin and the institutional terms collectively
have a larger role in explaining trade flows than physical distance, with the sum of the beta coefficients for
all eight interaction terms exceeding that for physical distance. Of note, the physical capital endowment
and legal institutions appear to have the largest influence on trade flows (as suggested by the large
beta coefficients: βf2 = 0.491, βlm2 = 0.654, βlm3 = 0.494). Column (1b) provides an alternative
summary of the quantitative effects. For each interaction, this reports ceteris paribus how much larger
the model predicts export volumes would be for the exporting country at the 75th versus 25th percentile,
in the 75th versus 25th percentile industry. To illustrate, consider the βf1 coefficient: The interquartile
gap in the human capital distribution in this sample of 83 countries is 0.415, while the corresponding
gap in the industry skill-intensity distribution is 0.494. The Column (1) estimate of βf1 then implies
that trade flows would rise by a sizeable factor of exp(1.246 × 0.415 × 0.494) = 1.29, namely a 29%
(2007). I report results using the zrs2 measure in Nunn’s notation, which is based on the liberal classification in Rauch
(1999) and also treats inputs that are reference-priced in trade journals as relationship-specific.
20The beta coefficient standardizes the OLS coefficient to capture the change in standard deviation units of the dependent
variable in response to a one standard deviation increase in the right-hand side variable.
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increase, when moving from the 25th percentile country and industry to the 75th percentile. Repeating
this for the other interactions confirms that the country attributes with the largest role as sources of
comparative advantage are the physical capital endowment (log(H/L)k× log(H/L)i, a 56% increase) and
legal institutions (HI × LEGAL, a 69% increase; RS × LEGAL, 59%; COMPL× LEGAL, 33%).
In sum, the above regressions confirm that the model provides a useful benchmark for explaining
the intensive margin of trade, namely conditional on observing positive trade flows. However, a key
concern with OLS is that two-thirds of the bilateral trade observations in the dataset are in fact zeros,
and these are dropped from the regression sample. Columns (2) and (2a) clearly suggest that OLS does
not provide the full picture: A probit regression based on equation (16) reveals that the same set of
trade determinants also has a lot of explanatory power for the extensive margin of trade. (Column (2)
reports marginal effects, while Column (2a) standardizes these to report the approximate increase in the
probability of observing a positive trade flow when the covariate is raised by one standard deviation.)
For example, physical distance has a significant effect in deterring trade completely, while several of the
sources of comparative advantage are also significant determinants of whether trade is non-zero.
As a consequence, it would be inappropriate to use the OLS estimates for a welfare exercise, without
first accounting for the potential coefficient bias from dropping the zeros. One view here is that the zeros
arise due to measurement issues, either because small volumes are rounded down to zero, or because of the
lack of reporting from less-developed countries (with zero assumed as a default). While this may explain
some of the zeros, the fact that the probit regression does a good job of predicting the zeros suggests
that there are more systematic economic forces at play inhibiting trade flows.21 Moreover, removing the
countries with the lowest per capita income levels, and hence presumably the poorest quality data, has
little effect on the OLS results (available upon request).22 In keeping with the Ricardian spirit of the
model, the approach I pursue is instead to view the zero trade flows as arising from large productivity gaps
between countries, which prevent low productivity countries from exporting to particular markets. This
requires a minimal modification of the EK framework to generate zero trade predictions. The underlying
parameters can then be re-estimated via simulated method of moments (SMM), by matching moments
of trade flows simulated from the model with the corresponding moments from the actual data.23
21In this regard, neither a simple tobit regression nor an ad hoc fix of adding one US dollar to each trade flow are likely
to be fully satisfactory (estimates from these procedures available on request). See however Eaton and Tamura (1994) for
a more comprehensive tobit procedure that models the censoring value as a function of observables.
22I experimented with removing the 10 poorest countries, as measured by GDP per capita in 1990, all of which are African
countries. The results are robust to removing slightly fewer or slightly more countries.
23Other approaches for dealing with the zeros-bias require more extreme departures from the EK model. Santos-Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) propose a Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood procedure for estimating gravity equations, but this entails
assuming a non-standard distribution for the error terms in (16). Helpman et al. (2007) implement a two-stage estimation
method, with a first-stage selection equation that determines the probability of observing positive trade. Their approach
views the presence of fixed costs to exporting as a key obstacle giving rise to the zeros, whereas such fixed costs are absent
in the baseline EK model here.
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4 Estimation by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM)
4.1 Modifying the theory to generate zeros
In its present form, the model from Section 2 precludes any zeros, since equation (9) establishes that each
country i has a strictly positive probability (albeit possibly tiny) of being the lowest-price supplier to any
country n for a given industry-k variety. Therefore, suppose instead that the productivity shocks, ki (j),
are now independent draws from a truncated Gumbel distribution with bounded support [x, x¯]. This
has the cdf: F˜ () = F ()−F (x)F (x¯)−F (x) , where F () = exp(− exp(−)). The bounded support now makes zero
predicted trade possible: Xkni will equal zero if there exists another country, i
′, which is systematically
more productive than i in this industry, to the extent that i cannot possibly become the lowest-price
exporter even with the best productivity shock, x¯. Formally, Xkni = 0 if and only if there exists a country
i′ 6= i such that:
λi + µk +
∑
{l,m}
βlmLilMkm + β0x¯ < λi′ + µk +
∑
{l,m}
βlmLi′lMkm + β0x
In contrast, under the previous specification of a Gumbel distribution with unbounded support, there
would have been a positive probability of trade between every country pair in each industry, since even
countries with a poor systematic component of productivity stood a chance of obtaining a large enough
productivity shock to become the lowest-price exporter of a positive measure of varieties. Truncating the
productivity distribution therefore represents a minimal extension of the model to generate zero trade
flows, without having to introduce further features such as fixed cost barriers.24
4.2 SMM estimation procedure
With the bounded support assumption, we unfortunately lose closed-form expressions for trade flows.
Nevertheless, given a set of parameter values, a complete set of trade flows can readily be simulated from
the underlying model. I therefore pursue estimation via a SMM procedure that searches for parameter
values that deliver predicted trade flows which match key statistical moments of the actual data as closely
as possible (Pakes and Pollard 1989). To implement this in practice, I take a discrete approximation
of the measure of varieties; with a slight abuse of notation, I index the varieties in each industry by
j = 1, 2, . . . , J . Using the price equation (6), and substituting in the distance and factor endowment
terms following the steps in (16), the log price of each variety in industry k is given by:
ln(pkni)
(j) =
1
θ
θβd ·Dni − F∑
f=1
θβf · skf ln
Vif
Vi0
−
∑
{l,m}
θβlm · LilMkm + I˜i + I˜k − (ki )(j)
 (17)
24Note that introducing fixed costs alone would be insufficient to generate zero trade predictions. One still needs to
impose a productivity distribution with bounded support, to ensure that countries with low systematic productivity levels
will never receive a large enough productivity shock to overcome the fixed cost barrier.
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Here, (ki )
(j) is a random draw from the truncated Gumbel distribution with support [x, x¯], while I˜i
captures all exporter fixed effects (such as δi) and I˜k groups together all industry-specific terms (such
as µk and δk). For any given realization of the parameter values, the steps for simulating a full set of
bilateral industry trade flows are as follows:
1. For each variety j in industry k, compute the prices presented by all N countries to each importing
country n using (17). This requires N × K × J independent draws from the truncated Gumbel
distribution for the productivity shocks, (ki )
(j). (Once drawn, these shocks are fixed throughout
the estimation procedure.)
2. For each importing country n, identify the country that presents it with the lowest price for variety
j from industry k. Denote this lowest price by (pkn,i(j))
(j), where i(j) identifies the (unique) exporter
of this variety to country n. Also, calculate the approximate ideal price indices:
(P kn )
1−ε ≈ 1
J
J∑
j=1
((pkn,i(j))
(j))1−ε (18)
3. Using the ideal price indices from (18), calculate the quantity demanded, (Qkn,i(j))
(j), for each
variety in country n using the expression from (3). Here, the country GDP data for Yn are taken
from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
4. Compute the value of exports from country i to n in industry k by summing over the relevant
exporter subscripts:
(Xkni)
sim =
1
J
∑
{j: i(j)=i}
(pkn,i(j))
(j)(Qkn,i(j))
(j) (19)
In practice, however, the number of fixed effects to be estimated in (17) is large and could strain the
reliability of conventional minimization algorithms. To reduce the number of parameters to be estimated,
I arrange the countries into five groups in ascending order of their aggregate export volumes in 1990, and
assign the same exporter fixed effect to each group of countries (which I denote by I˜i1, . . . I˜i5, in increasing
order of observed trade). Similarly, I sort the SIC industries into three groups according to the magnitude
of total trade in each industry, and assign the same industry fixed effect (I˜k1, . . . I˜k3) to each industry
group. (See Appendix Table 3A for the list of groups; the cutoffs between groups were selected at natural
breakpoints in the pecking order of trade volumes by exporter or industry.) Substituting the expression
for quantity demanded (3) into (19), it is straightforward to verify that (Xkni)
sim is invariant to any
constant additive term that shifts all the log prices in (17) by the same amount. I therefore set I˜i1 = 0
and I˜k1 = 0 as a normalization, since one of the country fixed effects and one of the industry fixed effects
cannot be identified.
18
The parameter vector, Θ, to be estimated is thus:
Θ = {βd1, . . . , βd6, βf1, βf2, βlm1, . . . , βlm6, I˜i2, . . . , I˜i5, I˜k2, I˜k3}
This comprises the distance, Heckscher-Ohlin and institutional coefficients, as well as the group fixed
effects. Before estimation, I set the remaining model parameters as follows. For the inverse spread
parameter θ, EK (2002) present a range of values from 2.44 up to 12.86, depending on the estimation
method. I set θ = 8.28, a central value in EK (2002). The good fit of the baseline OLS regressions
indicates that the closed-form expressions from the theory yield reasonable approximations for actual
trade, which in turn suggests that the productivity shock distribution should include most of the relevant
mass of the Gumbel distribution. The support of the truncated distribution is thus set to cover the central
99% of the mass of the (unbounded) Gumbel distribution, which implies x = −1.667 and x¯ = 5.296.25
For the elasticities of substitution, I take ε = 3.8 from Bernard et al. (2003), who estimate this from US
firm-level data. I set φ = 2 to satisfy the condition ε > φ > 1. I follow EK in setting η = 0.13 for the
consumption share of the manufacturing sector in total GDP. While it is possible to estimate some of
these parameters, such as ε, φ and η, by introducing additional moments to match, I opt not to do so to
focus on estimating the β coefficients in Θ, which are our primary interest.
The estimation problem is then to determine the parameter vector, Θˆ, that minimizes the distance
metric between selected moments, b(·), of the simulated trade flows, (Xkni)sim, and that of the actual
data, Xkni, in the spirit of Hansen (1982):
min
Θˆ
(b(Θˆ)− b(Θ))′ Ψ (b(Θˆ)− b(Θ))
On the choice of moments to match, I include in b(Θ) the following:
1. The OLS regression coefficients from (16). This gives 14 moments, which are particularly informa-
tive for estimating βd1, . . . , βd6, βf1, βf2, βlm1, . . . , βlm6.
2. The share of total trade flows in each group for Exporter Groups 2-5 and SIC Industry Groups 2-3.
These should be informative for estimating I˜i2, I˜i3, I˜i4, I˜i5, I˜k2 and I˜k3, the country and industry
fixed effects respectively.
Since the problem is exactly identified (as many moments as there are parameters), I set the optimal
weight matrix Ψ to the identity matrix. In practice, I first use a Newtonian search algorithm to determine
25The log price expression in (17) indicates that θ will be difficult to identify if one were to attempt to estimate it, since
1/θ enters multiplicatively with the coefficients and fixed effects parameters. In particular, when the productivity shock
distribution is exactly Gumbel, it is well-known from the theory of discrete choice models that θ cannot be identified. Given
the prior that the truncated productivity shock distribution covers most of the support of the Gumbel distribution, it is
likely not feasible to estimate θ, hence the decision to calibrate it. Likewise, it would not be easy to estimate either x or x¯,
since the Gumbel distribution is very flat in its upper and lower tails.
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the relevant parameter subspace in which the minima lies, before using the Nelder-Mead (1965) simplex
search to obtain the final estimates.26 I set J = 500; experimenting with larger J raises the computational
burden, without changing the value of the objective function substantially.
Having obtained the SMM estimates ΘˆSMM , I compute the standard errors based on the formula:
Λ = (Γ′Γ)−1Γ′V Γ(Γ′Γ)−1, where Γ = ∂∂Θ(b(Θˆ
SMM )− b(Θ)), and V is the variance-covariance matrix of
the moments (b(Θˆ)− b(Θ)). Specifically, the standard errors are equal to 1/√J times the square root of
the diagonal entries of Λ. Note that the underlying stochastic shocks, (ki )
(j), are the only source giving
rise to variation in the calculation of the moments. I thus estimate V through a Monte Carlo procedure,
as the empirical variance-covariance matrix of (b(Θˆ)− b(Θ)) based on 1000 sets of N ×K×J draws from
the truncated Gumbel distribution, when Θˆ is evaluated at ΘˆSMM .
4.3 The SMM estimates
The ΘˆSMM estimates are reported in Table 3, Column (3). Physical distance retains a negative and highly
significant effect on trade, although the magnitude of this coefficient is smaller than found with OLS (βd1
is now −0.919). This is a feature found with other bias correction methods related to the omission
of zeros in the gravity equation literature, such as Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman et
al. (2007). One explanation that has been offered is that the elasticity of trade volumes with respect
to distance declines over longer distances; the exclusion of the zeros thus biases the magnitude of the
OLS distance coefficient upwards, since the zeros correspond to high-distance country pairs where the
associated distance elasticity is low (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004, p.730).
Turning to the Heckscher-Ohlin and the institutional determinants, I find positive and significant
effects of these interaction terms that echo the baseline OLS results. (The small standard errors here
are a reflection of the good fit of the model moments to the data moments, as documented in Appendix
Table 3B.) It does appear that accounting for the zeros tends to reduce the SMM coefficients slightly
compared to the corresponding OLS coefficients, suggesting that these sources of comparative advantage
have quantitatively more explanatory power for the intensive margin of trade (how much countries trade)
than the extensive margin (whether countries trade). This is consistent for example with Manova (2006)
who finds using the Helpman et al. (2007) bias-correction method that about two-thirds of the effect
of financial development (CAPDEP × FINDEV ) operates through the intensive margin and about
one-thirds through selection into exporting.
How sensible are these estimates for explaining the actual trade data? I offer evidence here that the
model delivers a reasonable fit on several dimensions, namely the country income levels and accompanying
26Specifically, I first use the lsqnonlin command in MATLAB for the Newtonian search, followed by fminsearch for the
Nelder-Mead search. In practice, I find that initializing the search at different starting values leads to similar regions of the
parameter space.
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pattern of trade flows that it predicts in the global trade equilibrium.
Implied country GDP levels: I first close the model in order to solve for the equilibrium country
income levels, by appealing to a trade balance condition. With the discrete approximation for the measure
of varieties, total manufacturing exports from country i, EXPi, are given by:
EXPi ≈ 1
J
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
∑
{j: i(j)=i}
(pkn,i(j))
(j)(Qkn,i(j))
(j)
=
1
J
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
∑
{j: i(j)=i}
ηYn (P kn )
ε−φ∑
κ≥1(P κn )1−φ
((pkn,i(j))
(j))1−ε (20)
where the sum is taken over all varieties (across all industries) and over all export destinations for which
country i is the lowest-price exporter. Substituting in for (Qkn,i(j))
(j) from (3) yields (20), which expresses
total exports from country i as a linear combination of the country income levels, Yn. This property
follows from the Cobb-Douglas specification for utility, since the trade quantities are then linear functions
of the importing country’s GDP. I calculate the GDP coefficients, namely the η (P
k
n )
ε−φ∑
κ≥1(Pκn )1−φ
((pkn,i(j))
(j))1−ε
terms, at the the SMM estimate ΘˆSMM via simulation (with J = 500). On the other hand, i’s total
imports, IMPi, are equal to ηYi. The balanced trade condition, EXPi = IMPi for each country,
therefore gives a homogenous system of N linear equations in the N income levels Yn. Setting income
for the US to 1, and inverting this system yields the implied equilibrium country GDPs.27 Note that the
83 countries in the sample had a combined output equal to 92.7% of world nominal GDP in 1990, so the
country income levels computed should be reasonable approximations for actual GDP.
Figure 1 confirms that the implied values for country GDP based on ΘˆSMM successfully capture
the relative rank ordering of observed nominal income levels in 1990 (taken from the WDI). There is
a tendency for the model to slightly under-predict GDP, particularly for low-income countries which
tend to cluster under the 45-degree line. Nevertheless, the Spearman rank correlation between the two
variables is very high (0.54, significant at the 1% level), so that the model reproduces the rank order
of country income levels. (Likewise, the Pearson linear correlation between the two log income series is
high, equal to 0.58 and significant at the 1% level.)
Bilateral trade patterns: Figure 2 compares the actual data with a set of simulated trade flows
based on ΘˆSMM and the implied Yn’s calculated above. For comparability, I scale up the predicted Yn’s,
so that the value of US GDP is equal to that in the WDI. Overall, the model provides a reasonable fit to
the data, with the Pearson linear correlation between the two log trade flow series being 0.40 (significant
at the 1% level). The model also matches the zeros quite well (not shown due to the log scale): There
27To operationalize this procedure when the matrix to be inverted is sparse and close to singular, I add to any zero entries
in the matrix a small positive quantity (less than half the smallest non-zero entry); I subtract the relevant quantity from
the coefficient that corresponds to each country’s imports from itself, to ensure that the sum of the coefficients for each
country’s imports remains equal to η = 0.13.
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are 91,086 zeros in the actual data, of which 84,546 are shared with the simulated trade flows. Two brief
caveats are nevertheless in order. First, the model tends to under-predict trade volumes, which stems
largely from the propensity of the model to under-predict country income levels. Second, the generated
trade flows display a smaller amount of dispersion than the actual data, as evidenced by the smaller
coefficient of variation for the former (0.10 versus 0.19, calculated for the subset of non-zero trade flows).
The plots of predicted versus actual trade for each industry are similar in nature to Figure 2 (available
on request).
5 Welfare Counterfactuals
The structural approach adopted now allows us to explore various interesting counterfactual exercises
on the relative importance of distance and the various sources of comparative advantage from a welfare
perspective. I use the SMM estimates ΘˆSMM to explore these counterfactual implications of the model.
For a start, the framework allows us to examine the welfare effects of reducing distance barriers along
the lines studied in EK (2002). Furthermore, since the model ties comparative advantage to observable
country and industry characteristics, this facilitates quantifying the importance of different sources of
comparative advantage.
I adopt a welfare metric that comes naturally from the model, namely the representative consumer’s
indirect utility from maximizing utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2):
Wn =
(1− η)1−ηηη Yn
(p0n)1−η
(∑
k≥1(P kn )1−φ
) η
1−φ
(21)
Without the term, (1 − η)1−ηηη, this is precisely equal to country n’s real GDP. Note that the price of
the domestic non-tradable, p0n, has been introduced explicitly in the denominator: When solving for the
implied GDP levels, Yn, from the system of trade balance equations, one can only do so relative to a base
country (in our case, the US), whose income level is normalized to 1. This means that domestic factor
prices, and hence the price of domestic non-tradables will be endogenous in general equilibrium, and we
need to account for this in the welfare calculations. Note also that this welfare measure focuses on the
impact on a representative consumer, putting aside distributional consequences within countries.
The welfare change from policy shocks can be decomposed as the change in country nominal GDP
levels, net of the weighted sum of price changes in the domestic non-tradable and in the differentiated
products industries:
∆Wn
Wn
=
∆Yn
Yn
− (1− η)∆(p
0
n)
p0n
− η
∆
(∑
k≥1(P
k
n )
1−φ
)1/(1−φ)
(∑
k≥1(P kn )1−φ
)1/(1−φ) (22)
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As a baseline, I assume that factors of production are fully mobile domestically, but that factor
markets are segmented across countries. Factors can therefore move into industries that are favored by
the policy shock, with factor prices adjusting accordingly. This in principle captures an upper bound on
welfare gains, since it puts aside domestic factor markets frictions that hinder the full adjustment of the
economy to exploit shifts in comparative advantage. On the other hand, a lower bound is provided by the
−η∆(
∑
k≥1(P
k
n )
1−φ)1/(1−φ)
(
∑
k≥1(Pkn )1−φ)
1/(1−φ) term: This corresponds to the welfare gain in an extreme setting where factors
are completely immobile domestically, factor prices are pinned down by their marginal productivity in
the non-tradable sector, and country GDPs are therefore fixed. In this case, welfare gains accrue solely
from the decrease in the price of tradables.
For each counterfactual, I evaluate (22) by simulating a full set of country trade flows both before
and after introducing the shock, to compute Yn and
(∑
k≥1(P
k
n )
1−φ
)1/(1−φ)
, as well as their respective
percentage changes. As for the change in the price of the domestic non-tradable, this is equal to the
weighted sum of domestic factor price changes, where the weights are the factor share intensities in this
sector: ∆(p
0
n)
p0n
=
∑F
f=0 s
0
f
∆(wnf )
wnf
. I approximate the percentage change in wnf as the change in total factor
payments accruing to factor f in country n, net of any change in the endowment of that factor.28 To
fully operationalize this, I set the factor shares in the outside sector as follows: s0h = 0.175, s
0
l = 0.325,
s0k = 0.5, based on the average factor payment shares over the 1980s in US agriculture (the canonical
non-manufacturing sector) from Mundlak (2005).29
5.1 Reducing distance barriers
I first consider a transition towards a hypothetical zero-gravity world. Although physical distance and
transport costs can never be completely eliminated in practice, this nevertheless provides a useful gauge
of how much distance and geography hold back country welfare. To this end, I consider a counterfactual
where all distance variables are set to minimize their adverse impact on prices, namely where log physical
distance is 0 and all the five dummy variables (common language, common border, colony, GATT, RTA)
are equal to 1. Note that this is strictly speaking not a pure zero-gravity experiment: In the flexible
formulation of the model, the distance markup dkni in (14) cannot be set exactly to 1, as we cannot
distinguish δk empirically from other industry-specific terms that affect trade flows (in particular, the
28More explicitly, I compute the percentage change in factor prices as:
∆(wnf )
wnf
=
∆(s0f (1− η)Yn +
∑
k≥1 s
k
f
1
J
∑J
j=1
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s=1(p
k
sn)
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(j))
(s0f (1− η)Yn +
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k
f
1
J
∑J
j=1
∑N
s=1(p
k
sn)(j)(Qksn)(j))
− ∆(Vnf )
Vnf
The expression for total payments to factor f is evaluated numerically, using the prices, quantities and implied income levels
from before and after the policy shock to calculate the percentage change.
29I set sk = 0.5 based on the total factor payment share in value-added that accrues to physical capital and land (Mundlak
2005). In the absence of better data on the breakdown of the factor shares for skilled and unskilled labor, I split up the
residual share of 0.5 according to the average factor shares for non-production (sh) and production workers (sl) observed in
the NBER-CES dataset across manufacturing sectors.
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µk’s in the systematic component of productivity). What is being done here is instead to set the observable
distance measures such that the distance markup is as small as possible.
Table 4 reports sizeable overall gains in this low-gravity scenario, with an average welfare increase
of 15.7% in the 83-country sample. This is comparable to the range of country welfare increases that
EK (2002) reported from a zero-gravity exercise with their OECD sample (16.1%-24.1%). Decomposing
this welfare change using (22), the fall in the price of tradables contributes a fair amount of this welfare
gain (10.1%), but the bulk of the increase is driven by the increase in country income levels (19.1%) as
the removal of distance barriers opens more trading opportunities. This is partially offset by the rise in
the price of non-tradables: The increase in foreign demand for each countries’ products raises demand
for factors of production domestically. Factor prices rise as a result, bringing up the price of domestic
non-tradables. (The lower half of Table 4 reports the less extreme scenario where only physical distance
is set to 0, or equivalently where βd1 = 0. As expected, this implies more moderate welfare gains.)
The move towards a zero-gravity world exhibits some interesting features. Figure 3 graphs this
transition as barriers are successively reduced from the status quo (x = 0), to the case where all observable
barriers are set to minimize the distance markup (x = 1), and beyond. The solid line indicates an
initial rise in the concentration of production by country source within each industry, as illustrated by
a Herfindahl index of producer shares in each industry,
∑N
i=1
(∑
kX
k
ni/
∑
i
∑
kX
k
ni
)2, averaged across
the 20 industries (plots for each of the 20 industries are similar). Evidently, the initial removal of
distance barriers favors existing producer countries, which can be described as an expansion of exports
on the intensive margin. This increase in concentration is accompanied by a fall in welfare in the global
equilibrium (illustrated for Zimbabwe and Spain, at the 25th and 75th per capita income percentiles
respectively; trends are similar for other countries). Only as distance is reduced more substantially do
exports expand also on the extensive margin as new countries start exporting, so that this concentration
index eventually falls below the status quo level and country welfare also turns around to register positive
gains.30 Throughout this transition, the prices of tradables are declining uniformly, so what is driving
this non-monotonicity in welfare is the response of country incomes as the trade equilibrium shifts.
5.2 Sources of comparative advantage
To assess how much the various comparative advantage forces matter for country welfare, I neutralize
the terms in the empirical model that correspond to each source of comparative advantage country-by-
country. These results are summarized in Table 5, the main column of interest here being the “Mean”
column, which reports the welfare loss for the country for which the comparative advantage force is shut
30The mean of the 20 industry Herfindahl indices of producer concentration drops from a status quo value of 0.16 to 0.12
(at x = 1). A simple one-sided t-test rejects the null hypothesis of no change in this producer concentration Herfindahl
across industries at the 1% level.
24
down, averaged across the 83 country-by-country scenarios.
Consider first the role of Ricardian forces. Removing the stochastic component of productivity by
setting the (ki )
(j) draws to 0 for each country in turn leads to a mean welfare loss of about −5.8%.
Since the stochastic shocks inherit a thick right-tail from the Gumbel distribution, removing these shocks
tends to worsen country productivity on average, leading to a drop in welfare. This welfare loss is much
smaller than the −36.6% decline when the systematic component of productivity is shut down, which
is done by setting the −∑{l,m} θβlm · LilMkm + I˜i + I˜k term in (17) equal to the maximum value in
the sample, so that the systematic component of productivity does not reduce log prices differentially
across countries and industries.31 The decomposition of these changes once again shows that most of
the welfare shifts are being driven by changes in country GDP in the new trade equilibrium. Moreover,
once the systematic component has been neutralized, removing the stochastic shocks has little further
impact on country welfare (the differences only show up in the third decimal place). This is reassuring,
as it indicates that the key productivity term is the systematic component which depends on observable
fundamentals, namely the actual characteristics of the countries and industries being studied.
Turning to the Heckscher-Ohlin forces, the second panel in Table 5 tabulates the effect of neutralizing
the interaction terms that capture the role of factor endowments. (This is done for each f by setting
−θβf · skf ln VifVi0 in (17) to the maximum value in the sample.) The model implies large effects here,
as country welfare declines on average by −20.8% when human capital is not allowed to be a force in
reducing prices across countries or industries; the corresponding loss in the case of physical capital is
−28.7%. The last column of Table 5 correlates the percentage welfare change experienced in a country
against its initial factor endowment level. Not surprisingly, more skill-abundant countries suffer a larger
welfare loss when this source of comparative advantage is shut down (see Figure 4, Panel A). There is a
similar negative correlation between a country’s physical capital endowment and the subsequent welfare
losses (Panel B). When both factor endowment motives for trade are shut down, welfare declines by a
substantial −34.5%.
I perform a similar exercise to assess the quantitative impact of the institutional determinants that
have received attention in the recent literature. (For each {l,m}, this is done by setting −θβlm ·LilMkm
in (17) to the maximum value in the sample; this is the sense in which the institutional determinants are
a subset of the Ricardian forces, specifically the systematic component of productivity.) The calculations
point to fairly sizeable roles for financial development and flexible labor market institutions, with mean
welfare losses of −19.2% and −9.4% respectively when these channels of comparative advantage are shut
down. The most substantial welfare effects though center on legal institutions, particularly on their role
in establishing a contracting environment that facilitates production in industries vulnerable to holdup
31For simplicity, this assumes that all of the fixed effects, I˜i + I˜k, can be attributed to the systematic component of
productivity.
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problems: Shutting down specialization on the basis of industry input-concentration (HI) or the share of
relationship-specific inputs (RS) implies average welfare losses of −33.5% and −31.8% respectively. The
role of job complexity (COMPL) here is also non-trivial, with a mean welfare loss of −15.7% when this
mechanism is switched off. Once again, the correlations in the final column indicate that the stronger a
country’s institutions, the more each institutional determinant will matter in terms of the welfare loss
from shutting down that source of comparative advantage. (This is illustrated in Figure 4, Panel C for
FINDEV and Panel D for LEGAL.)
How do these effects contrast with the impact of distance? To provide some basis for comparison,
the last part of Table 5 considers the analogous exercise of raising distance barriers (the θβd ·Dni terms
in (17)) country-by-country to the maximum observed in the dataset. The model yields average welfare
losses here that are of a similar order of magnitude (−37.8%) to the losses calculated when either all
Ricardian terms (−36.6%) or all Heckscher-Ohlin terms (−34.5%) are shut down.
In short, the model points to the conclusion that Ricardian forces, Heckscher-Ohlin forces, and dis-
tance variables share a similar degree of importance in terms of their quantitative implications for country
welfare. (That said, it should be stressed that the numbers in Table 5 should not be interpreted as a
strict decomposition, as the counterfactuals for each set of forces have been run separately.)
5.3 Country policy experiments
The model also allows us to examine more closely the effects of raising the characteristics of specific
countries, to evaluate the consequences of such country policy experiments. I illustrate this using a
large developing country, Indonesia, which lies between the 25th and 33rd percentiles on each of the
country characteristics studied (the exercise can certainly be repeated for other countries of interest). In
particular, I consider what happens when raising Indonesia to the world frontier level, approximated by
the maximum level in the sample, along each of these country dimensions, to provide some benchmark
numbers for the potential gain from a broad increase in factor endowments or an improvement in the
quality of institutions.
Table 6 reports the results from these policy experiments. I first raise each country characteristic
for Indonesia as it appears in each interaction term. The welfare gains from expanding Indonesia’s
factor endowments are fairly substantial, equal to 9.8% and 18.5% respectively from raising the per
worker human capital and physical capital ratios to the world frontier level. A sizeable part of this
increase is actually driven by an endowment effect, which decreases domestic factor prices and makes
the non-tradable good (k = 0) relatively cheaper to consumers. This is particularly so in the scenario
where Indonesia’s human capital is raised; the change in non-tradables price would also have been even
more negative in the physical capital scenario had this endowment effect not been present. For the
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institutional determinants, the figures suggest especially large benefits from raising legal institutions to
first-world standards, particularly when all three interactions involving LEGAL are taken into account
(under “Joint effects”). While Indonesia clearly gains under these policy experiments, the repercussions
on the rest of the world (ROW) tend to be tiny. Any adverse beggar-thy-neighbor effects from policy
shocks in Indonesia – from the diversion of export opportunities away from other countries – thus appear
to be small.
Focusing on a policy shock to one country alone also allows us to explore in finer detail what happens
to industry composition in that country. Table 7 confirms that there is indeed a substantial amount
of reallocation taking place between industries in Indonesia in response to each policy change. These
production patterns indeed shift towards industries that are more dependent on the country attribute that
has been enhanced. For example, when Indonesia’s skill endowment is raised, more skill-intensive and
complex industries tend to expand at the expense of less skill-intensive and complex ones, as evidenced by
the positive correlation reported between the change in industry relative size and log(H/L)k and COMPL
respectively (see also, Figure 5, Panel A). Figure 5 provides several further illustrations of these systematic
shifts in industry structure: Physical capital accumulation favors capital-intensive industries (Panel B),
an expansion of private credit favors industries that are dependent on external finance (Panel C), and
an improvement in the legal environment shifts resources towards industries that are more vulnerable to
holdup problems (Panel D).
It is worth highlighting some caveats about the precise interpretation of these welfare counterfactuals.
When raising a country characteristic exogenously, I shock the relevant interaction term involving that
characteristic, while holding the exporter fixed effect constant. The welfare changes calculated are there-
fore strictly due to the induced shift in the pattern of industrial specialization. Since this holds constant
any direct level effects from the expansion in countries’ production capacities, it likely understates the
magnitude of welfare changes. These exercises also focus solely on the gains from these policy moves.
There are certainly costs to implementing these policies, such as the foregone current consumption from
physical capital accumulation or the structural adjustment costs as factors move across industries, but
these lie outside the scope of the model.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a methodology for estimating and quantifying the importance of different sources
of comparative advantage that jointly determine the pattern of trade, in a manner that allows the
researcher to evaluate pertinent counterfactual scenarios. To understand patterns of specialization, I
present an extension of the multi-country Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to explain trade
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flows at the industry level. The model expresses comparative advantage as a function of country-industry
matches, so that countries specialize in those industries whose production needs they can best provide
for with their endowment mix or institutional strengths.
I pursue two estimation approaches: (i) an OLS baseline in Section 3, and (ii) a simulated method
of moments (SMM) procedure in Section 4 that takes into account the prevalence of zero trade observa-
tions. Both sets of estimates confirm the relevance of traditional gravity measures, particularly physical
distance, for explaining bilateral trade flows. I also jointly corroborate the role of factor endowments and
country institutions – including financial development, the contracting environment, and labor market
regimes – as sources of comparative advantage. The SMM estimates in turn imply welfare effects of a
reasonable magnitude in various counterfactual scenarios. In particular, these suggest that Ricardian
forces, Heckscher-Ohlin forces, and distance barriers are approximately equally important in terms of
their influence on country welfare. Among the institutional determinants of trade, the model also points
to legal institutions as being particularly influential, with the largest gains stemming from improvements
to the contracting environment that alleviate holdup problems in production.
A key strength of this modeling framework is that it is in fact very flexible, allowing the researcher to
incorporate a full set of country-industry interaction terms identified in the recent literature as significant
sources of comparative advantage. While I have attempted to be comprehensive here, the model is
certainly more general in that it can in principle accommodate additional relevant interaction terms or
more flexible functional forms (such as non-linear effects), subject to the caveat that this will raise the
computational cost for the SMM procedure. There are of course some limitations to bear in mind when
interpreting the counterfactual results. These exercises treat the policy changes as exogenous shocks for
simplicity, putting aside such dynamic issues as the process of adjustment to the new trade equilibrium, or
potential policy responses by other countries. That said, the paper takes useful steps towards establishing
a quantitative methodology for tying specialization patterns to country and industry characteristics, and
towards more extensive applications of structural estimation methods to analyze the determinants of
trade flows.
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8 Data Appendix
A. BILATERAL VARIABLES
Trade volumes: From Feenstra et al. (2005), for the year 1990, in thousands of current US dollars.
Converted from SITC Rev 2 into US 1987 SIC format using a concordance based on Feenstra, Romalis
and Schott (2002), henceforth FRS. FRS record US export data at the highly disaggregate Harmonized
System (HS) 10-digit level, where each HS-10 product is also assigned a 5-digit SITC Rev 2 and a 4-digit
SIC-87 category. This is used to derive concordance weights to map SITC Rev 2 categories into SIC-87
format, following the procedure in Cun˜at and Melitz (2007).
Two complications arise. First, classification for the SIC-87 categories is based on observed finished
products, but the distinction between SIC industries is often defined according to the production process.
To cite an example from FRS, SIC 2011 and SIC 2013 are both for processed meats, with the difference
being that 2011 conducts its own slaughtering while 2013 uses purchased carcasses. When products are
observed at the dock, it is not possible to distinguish between the two, and so trade flows for both are
merged under SIC 2011, with 2013 omitted from the FRS dataset. Table 1.3 in FRS lists the affected
industries, detailing which categories have been excluded and which codes the export value has been
merged under. I break up the merged trade flows for the affected categories in proportion to the value of
US total shipments in 1990 reported in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database (Bartelsman
et al. 2000).32 Then, the SITC codes associated with the included SIC industry are also assigned to
the previously excluded SIC industries. A second complication relates to Feenstra et al.’s (2005) use of
SITC codes with suffixes ‘A’ and ‘X’, for trade flows not observed at a more disaggregate level. I assign
the trade in these ‘A’ and ‘X’ categories to the truncated (more aggregate) SITC code. In other words,
I treat 111A and 111X as coming from the 3-digit SITC category 111, and then use FRS to construct
weights to map SITC 111 into SIC categories.
Trade flows were summed up to the 2-digit SIC level, yielding 20 industry groups. A zero is entered
for all exporter-importer-industry cells for which no trade was reported.
Distance: Physical distance is measured by the great circle formula distance between countries’ capi-
tal cities, taken from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).33 A
country’s log distance to itself is set to zero, so that physical distance does not impose an iceberg cost for
internal trade. The following binary variables are also from the CEPII: (i) “Common Language”, equal
to 1 if at least 9% of each country’s population speaks a shared language; and (ii) “Colony”, equal to 1
if one of the countries had ever colonized the other. The “Border” dummy (equal to 1 if the countries
share a land border) is coded using the CIA World Factbook.34 The following two measures are based
on Rose (2004), augmented by direct reference to the WTO website35 to cover all country pairs in my
sample for the year 1990: (i) “RTA”, equal to 1 if the countries are joint signatories in any of the regional
trade agreements reported to the WTO; and (ii) “GATT”, equal to 1 if both countries are GATT/WTO
members. A value of 1 is assigned for all five dummies for a country’s distance from itself.
32One exception: SIC 2092 is excluded from FRS, with the associated trade flows being merged under SIC 0912 and
0913, which are primary fishing industries. Since shipment data for the 09XX categories is not available in the NBER-CES
database, I imputed all of 0912 and 0913 to 2092.
33http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
34http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
35http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/gattmem e.htm
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B. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Factor intensities: From the NBER-CES database. Variables are calculated for each 2-digit SIC-87
industry. Skill intensity is the log of the ratio of non-production workers to total employment. Physical
intensity is the log of the ratio of real capital stock to total employment. Both ratios are averages over
the period 1980-89.
The welfare counterfactuals require information on industry factor payment shares. These are ob-
tained from the same NBER-CES database, using averages over 1980-89. The share of payments to
skilled labor (sh) and unskilled labor (sl) are calculated by the ratios of non-production worker payroll
and production worker payroll to total industry value-added respectively. The factor share of physical
capital (sk) is the ratio of residual payments (total value-added minus total payroll) to total value-added.
External capital dependence (CAPDEP ): Constructed following the methodology in Rajan and
Zingales (1998). Data from Compustat is used, which covers all publicly-traded firms in North America.
A given firm’s dependence on external capital is the fraction of total capital expenditures over the period
1980-89 not financed by internal cash flow. The median value across firms in each SIC-87 2-digit category
is used as the industry measure of CAPDEP . (The measure in Rajan and Zingales (1998) is constructed
for a different classification system, namely ISIC 3- and 4-digit industries.)
Input concentration (HI): Constructed following Levchenko (2007). Equal to the Herfindahl index
of intermediate input use, based on the 1987 US Input-Output (IO) Use Table. The IO-87 6-digit level
categories map cleanly into the SIC-87 4-digit categories based on the correspondence table provided
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).36 When an IO-87 category maps into more than one SIC
category, I split the inputs in proportion to US domestic shipments in the SIC destination categories,
using the total shipments reported in the NBER-CES database as weights. Input use is then aggregated
to the SIC 2-digit level, from which the input Herfindahl is calculated.
Input Relationship-Specificity (RS): From Nunn (2007). RS is the share (by value) of inputs that
are not sold on an organized exchange; this corresponds to the measure zrs2 in Nunn (2007). Data on
input use is from the 1987 US Input-Output Use Table. Rauch (1999) provides the classification of goods
into: (i) those sold on an organized exchange; (ii) those reference-priced in commercial publications; and
(iii) goods that fall in neither of the above categories. Moving from (i) to (iii), one has successively
more differentiated and hence more relationship-specific inputs. Rauch provides two codings, one “con-
servative” and one “liberal”; I use the “liberal” classification. I map the IO-87 codes to SIC-87 4-digit
categories with the procedure described for the HI variable. The measure is aggregated up to the 2-digit
level by taking a weighted average, using the share of total input consumption of each 4-digit industry
as weights. (The measure in Nunn (2007) is constructed for IO-87 industries instead.)
Job complexity (COMPL): Based on Costinot (2007). The 1985 and 1993 instalments of the US Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) contain a question asking respondents to gauge how many months
it would take a typical new employee with the requisite education background to become “fully trained
and qualified” in the respondents’ job. Costinot (2007) calculates the average response for SIC-1972
36Available at: http://www.bea.gov/bea/pn/ndn0016.zip. All SIC 4-digit industries are associated with a unique IO-87
6-digit category, except for SIC 3999 which is matched with two IO-87 6-digit categories.
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3-digit industries, normalized to a maximum value of 1. I assign these values to the corresponding 4-digit
sub-categories. For missing 4-digit level observations, I assign the median complexity level observed at
successively higher levels of industry aggregation (first at the 3-digit level, and if that is still missing, at
the 2-digit level, and then at the 1-digit level). These are then transformed from SIC-1972 to SIC-1987
categories using the weights in the correspondence table developed by Bartelsman, Becker and Gray.37
The value of COMPL for each SIC-1987 2-digit industry is then taken as the median over all its 4-digit
sub-categories. There are two industry groups for which this imputation procedure may seem too liberal,
namely SIC 21 and 29, for which direct information on complexity is not available in the PSID for any
of the 3-digit sub-categories. The OLS results are similar if I omit these two industry groups.
Sales Volatility (SV OL): From Cun˜at and Melitz (2007). Equal to the employment-weighted standard
deviation of sales growth for firms in the 1980-2004 Compustat sample. Only firms with at least 5 years
of data are used. Observations where the absolute sales growth rate exceeds 300% are omitted as outliers.
C. COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Factor endowments: Physical capital per worker (log(K/L)i) and human capital per worker (log(H/L)i)
are from Hall and Jones (1999), for the year 1988.
Financial development (FINDEV ): From Beck et al.’s (2000) Financial Structure and Economic
Development Database, March 14 2005 update. Equal to the amount of credit extended by banks and
other non-bank financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, averaged over 1980-89.
Legal System (LEGAL): From Gwartney and Lawson (2004). Index measure of “Legal System and
Property Rights” for 1985, rescaled between 0 and 1, which is composite of five sub-indices on: judicial
independence; impartiality of courts; protection of intellectual property; military interference in the rule
of law and the political process; and integrity of the legal system. These sub-indices are drawn from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), the former
being a private institutional assessment, while the latter is an international survey of business executives.
Employment Flexibility (FLEX): From the World Bank’s Doing Business database. Index of “Rigid-
ity of Employment”, averaged over 2003-06, rescaled to be increasing in labor market flexibility and to lie
between 0 and 1. Calculated as the average of three sub-indices on: the difficulty of hiring a new worker;
restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours; and the difficulty and expense of
dismissing a redundant worker. The indices are coded based on the methodology in Botero et al. (2004).
GDP: Both GDP and GDP per capita are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI), in
current US dollars.
Population: From the WDI.
37Available at: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/
Concordances/FromusSIC/sic7287.txt
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Table 1A
List of SIC-87 2-digit Industries (20)
SIC Major groups: (2-digit level)
20: Food and Kindred Products
21: Tobacco Products
22: Textile Mill Products
23: Apparel and other Finished Products made from Fabrics and similar materials
24: Lumber and Wood Products, except Furniture
25: Furniture and Fixtures
26: Paper and Allied Products
27: Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries
28: Chemicals and Allied Products
29: Petroleum Refining and Related Industries
30: Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31: Leather and Leather Products
32: Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products
33: Primary Metal Industries
34: Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery and Transportation Equipment
35: Industrial and Commercial Machinery, and Computer Equipment
36: Electronic and other Electrical Equipment, except Computer Equipment
37: Transportation Equipment
38: Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments
(Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks)
39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
Table 1B
List of Countries in Sample (83)
Countries: (ISO codes in parentheses)
Argentina (ARG); Australia (AUS); Austria (AUT); Burundi (BDI); Belgium (BEL); Bolivia (BOL);
Brazil (BRA); Central African Republic (CAF); Canada (CAN); Switzerland (CHE); Chile (CHL);
China (CHN); Ivory Coast (CIV); Cameroon (CMR); Colombia (COL); Costa Rica (CRI); Germany
(DEU); Denmark (DNK); Dominican Republic (DOM); Algeria (DZA); Ecuador (ECU); Egypt (EGY);
Spain (ESP); Finland (FIN); France (FRA); United Kingdom (GBR); Ghana (GHA); Greece (GRC);
Guatemala (GTM); Honduras (HND); Haiti (HTI); Hungary (HUN); Indonesia (IDN); India (IND);
Ireland (IRL); Iran (IRN); Israel (ISR); Italy (ITA); Jamaica (JAM); Jordan (JOR); Japan (JPN);
Kenya (KEN); South Korea (KOR); Sri Lanka (LKA); Morocco (MAR); Madagascar (MDG); Mexico
(MEX); Mali (MLI); Malawi (MWI); Malaysia (MYS); Niger (NER); Nigeria (NGA); Nicaragua
(NIC); Netherlands (NLD); Norway (NOR); New Zealand (NZL); Pakistan (PAK); Panama (PAN);
Peru (PER); Philippines (PHL); Papua New Guinea (PNG); Poland (POL); Portugal (PRT); Paraguay
(PRY); Senegal (SEN); Singapore (SGP); Sierra Leone (SLE); El Salvador (SLV); Sweden (SWE);
Syria (SYR); Chad (TCD); Togo (TGO); Thailand (THA); Tunisia (TUN); Turkey (TUR); Uganda
(UGA); Uruguay (URY); United States (USA); Venezuela (VEN); South Africa (ZAF); Zaire (ZAR);
Zambia (ZMB); Zimbabwe (ZWE)
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Table 2
Baseline OLS Regression Model of Bilateral Industry Trade Flows
(Gravity equation estimation, with fixed effects)
Dependent variable = ln
(
Xkni
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Distance and Geography:
βd1: Log (Distance) −1.152*** −1.155*** −1.153*** −1.161*** −1.162*** −1.155*** −1.155***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
βd2: Common Language 0.487*** 0.495*** 0.498*** 0.500*** 0.502*** 0.492*** 0.496***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
βd3: Colony 0.769*** 0.770*** 0.766*** 0.768*** 0.768*** 0.771*** 0.769***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
βd4: Border 0.203 0.193 0.191 0.192 0.192 0.191 0.193
(0.149) (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
βd5: RTA 0.269*** 0.289*** 0.292*** 0.288*** 0.289*** 0.291*** 0.288***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
βd6: GATT 0.180 0.226 0.227 0.226 0.207 0.237 0.225
(0.237) (0.238) (0.241) (0.240) (0.237) (0.243) (0.238)
Heckscher-Ohlin: (industry char. × country char.)
βf1: log(H/L)
k × log(H/L)i 4.148*** 3.373*** 2.478*** 3.705*** 1.646*** 4.174***
(0.158 (0.158) (0.168) (0.156) (0.243) (0.158)
βf2: log(K/L)
k × log(K/L)i 0.056*** 0.038** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.041** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Institutional: (industry char. × country char.)
βlm1: CAPDEP × FINDEV 1.859***
(0.083)
βlm2: HI × LEGAL 35.544***
(1.633)
βlm3: RS × LEGAL 14.684***
(0.834)
βlm4: COMPL × LEGAL 7.864***
(0.413)
βlm5: COMPL × log(H/L)i 1.376***
(0.429)
βlm6: SV OL × FLEX 12.691***
(2.239)
Exporter fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-industry fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 45034 45034 45034 45034 45034 45034 45034
R2 0.586 0.600 0.605 0.607 0.605 0.606 0.600
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by exporter-importer pair, are reported; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include exporter and importer-industry fixed effects.
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Table 3
Empirical Model of Bilateral Industry Trade Flows (OLS, Probit, SMM)
In Columns (1), (1a), (1c), Dependent variable = ln
(
Xkni
)
(1) (1a) (1b) (2) (2a) (3)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit SMM
Betas Quantitative Marginal Standardized
Effects Effects Marg. Effects
Distance and Geography:
βd1: Log (Distance) −1.161*** −0.319*** −0.172*** −0.136*** −0.919***
(0.038) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002)
βd2: Common Language 0.502*** 0.062*** 0.107*** 0.042*** 0.400***
(0.069) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002)
βd3: Colony 0.766*** 0.052*** 0.124*** 0.018*** 0.603***
(0.107) (0.007) (0.027) (0.004) (0.003)
βd4: Border 0.189 0.012 −0.010 −0.002 0.130***
(0.149) (0.009) (0.037) (0.006) (0.003)
βd5: RTA 0.290*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.014*** 0.192***
(0.072) (0.008) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003)
βd6: GATT 0.217 0.025 −0.049 −0.022 0.168***
(0.242) (0.028) (0.044) (0.020) (0.008)
Heckscher-Ohlin: (industry char. × country char.)
βf1: log(H/L)
k × log(H/L)i 1.246*** 0.170*** 1.29 0.159*** 0.074*** 1.245***
(0.250) (0.034) (0.029) (0.013) (0.037)
βf2: log(K/L)
k × log(K/L)i 0.164*** 0.491*** 1.56 0.016*** 0.170*** 0.093***
(0.020) (0.060) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002)
Institutional: (industry char. × country char.)
βlm1: CAPDEP × FINDEV 1.279*** 0.111*** 1.15 0.064*** 0.015*** 0.883***
(0.089) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011)
βlm2: HI × LEGAL 14.307*** 0.654*** 1.69 0.789*** 0.126*** 8.867***
(1.669) (0.076) (0.181) (0.029) (0.341)
βlm3: RS × LEGAL 9.638*** 0.494*** 1.59 0.678*** 0.119*** 7.032***
(0.855) (0.044) (0.088) (0.015) (0.143)
βlm4: COMPL × LEGAL 2.919*** 0.145*** 1.33 0.057 0.008 3.426***
(0.448) (0.022) (0.048) (0.007) (0.154)
βlm5: COMPL × log(H/L)i 1.462*** 0.098*** 1.20 −0.219*** −0.043*** 0.611***
(0.429) (0.029) (0.051) (0.010) (0.078)
βlm6: SV OL × FLEX 9.043*** 0.092*** 1.09 −0.309 −0.010 8.831***
(2.239) (0.023) (0.271) (0.009) (0.381)
Exporter fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Groups
Importer-industry fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Groups
Number of obs. 45034 45034 45034 134972 134972 –
R2 or Pseudo-R2 0.613 0.613 – 0.646 0.646 –
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. For the OLS and probit regressions, exporter
and importer-industry fixed effects are included, with robust standard errors clustered by exporter-importer pair. Column (1a) reports
standardized beta coefficients from the Column (1) specification, while Column (1b) reports the factor increase in trade in the 75th
compared to the 25th percentile exporter and industry. Column (2) performs a probit regression on the probability of observing positive
trade, with Column (2a) standardizing these to report the probability change from a one standard deviation increase in the right-hand
side variable. Column (3) presents the SMM coefficients, where the exporter and industry fixed effects have been grouped (as discussed
in the text); these group fixed effects are not reported.
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Table 4
Counterfactuals I: Reducing distance barriers
% Welfare Change Decomposition
Due to change in:
Std. Country Prices Prices
Min. Max. Dev. Mean GDP (k ≥ 1) (k = 0)
Reducing all distance barriers −13.1 48.5 12.3 15.7 19.1 10.1 −13.5
By GDP per capita:
5th percentile TCD 12.8 −53.9 13.3 53.4
25th percentile ZWE 13.4 −52.1 13.7 51.7
50th percentile SLV 16.4 0.5 14.1 1.8
75th percentile ESP 33.9 196.7 8.9 −171.7
95th percentile DNK 23.1 139.5 4.9 −121.3
Reducing physical distance alone −37.1 49.8 12.5 8.9 −17.4 8.3 18.0
By GDP per capita:
5th percentile TCD 8.3 −73.1 11.3 70.1
25th percentile ZWE 9.1 −71.3 12.0 68.5
50th percentile SLV 11.8 −18.7 12.0 18.5
75th percentile ESP 29.9 177.2 7.5 −154.8
95th percentile DNK 14.0 83.7 3.1 −72.8
Notes: The mean percentage welfare change across countries is reported in the “Mean” column. The decomposition breaks
this down into the contributions from changes in country GDP, changes in the differentiated goods price index (k ≥ 1), and
changes in the price of domestic non-tradables (k = 0). These are also reported for the countries at the 5th, 25th, 50th,
75th, and 95th percentiles of GDP per capita (in US dollars) among the 83 countries. All percentages are calculated as
100 ln(x′/x), where x′ and x are the final and initial values respectively.
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Table 5
Counterfactuals II: Sources of Comparative Advantage
% Welfare Change Decomposition Correlation
Due to change in: with
Comparative advantage force(s) Std. Country Prices Prices cty. char.
switched off Min. Max. Dev. Mean GDP (k ≥ 1) (k = 0)
Ricardian forces:
Stochastic component −55.7 19.1 9.3 −5.8 −44.8 −1.0 40.1
Systematic component −145.0 0.9 40.5 −36.6 −321.9 −3.9 289.2
Both stochastic and systematic −145.0 0.9 40.5 −36.6 −321.9 −3.9 289.2
Heckscher-Ohlin forces:
log(H/L)k × log(H/L)i −69.5 −0.1 19.5 −20.8 −169.1 −1.8 150.1 −0.46***
log(K/L)k × log(K/L)i −117.4 −0.1 30.9 −28.7 −229.6 −2.4 203.2 −0.63***
All Heckscher-Ohlin forces −135.9 −0.2 37.0 −34.5 −288.6 −3.3 257.4
Institutional determinants:
CAPDEP × FINDEV −75.8 −0.1 19.6 −19.2 −152.3 −1.6 134.6 −0.58***
HI × LEGAL −140.3 −0.1 37.4 −33.5 −269.9 −3.0 239.4 −0.87***
RS × LEGAL −134.6 −0.1 35.4 −31.8 −253.5 −2.8 224.4 −0.87***
COMPL × LEGAL −67.2 −0.0 17.5 −15.7 −120.7 −1.0 105.9 −0.66***
COMPL × log(H/L)i −19.0 −0.0 4.6 −3.9 −29.4 −0.2 25.8 −0.84***
SV OL × FLEX −50.0 −0.1 10.7 −9.4 −73.0 −0.7 64.3 −0.40***
All institutional determinants −145.0 0.9 40.5 −36.6 −321.4 −3.9 288.6
Distance: (for comparison)
Physical distance only −126.1 −1.2 37.4 −37.1 −301.4 −6.0 270.3
All distance barriers −132.4 −1.9 38.0 −37.8 −305.5 −6.5 274.2
Notes: For each row, the comparative advantage force is neutralized country-by-country. The mean percentage welfare
change for the country for which the comparative advantage force is shut down is reported in the “Mean” column. The
decomposition breaks this down into the contributions from changes in country GDP, changes in the differentiated goods
price index (k ≥ 1), and changes in the price of domestic non-tradables (k = 0). The final column reports the cross-country
Pearson correlation between the percent welfare change and the initial level of the corresponding country characteristic; ***
denotes significance at the 1% level respectively. All percentages are calculated as 100 ln(x′/x), where x′ and x are the final
and initial values respectively.
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Table 6
Counterfactuals IIIA: Country Policy Experiments for IDN
% Welfare Change: IDN ROW
IDN rank Due to change in:
(out of 83) Country Prices Prices
Total GDP (k ≥ 1) (k = 0) Mean
Raising:
log(H/L)k ×max(log(H/L)i) 30 9.8 −46.3 −0.8 56.9 0.002
log(K/L)k ×max(log(K/L)i) 33 18.5 69.1 1.1 −51.7 −0.005
CAPDEP ×max(FINDEV ) 23 1.0 11.1 0.0 −10.2 0.001
HI ×max(LEGAL) 36 36.8 291.7 3.8 −258.7 −0.011
RS ×max(LEGAL) 36 26.6 216.8 3.0 −193.2 −0.011
COMPL×max(LEGAL) 36 4.8 47.3 0.6 −43.1 −0.001
COMPL×max(log(H/L)i) 30 1.8 13.9 0.2 0.7 −0.001
SV OL×max(FLEX) 34 4.1 40.2 0.6 −36.7 −0.003
Joint Effects:
max(log(H/L)i) 30 10.2 −39.5 −0.7 50.4 0.003
max(LEGAL) 36 106.8 795.0 8.6 −696.8 −0.023
Notes: The decomposition breaks down the percentage welfare change for IDN into that due to the change in country GDP,
the change in the differentiated goods price index (k ≥ 1), and the change in the price of domestic non-tradables (k = 0).
The final column reports the mean welfare change in the 82 other countries in the sample (Rest of the World: ROW). All
percentages are calculated as 100 ln(x′/x), where x′ and x are the final and initial values respectively.
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Table 7
Counterfactuals IIIB: Impact on IDN’s industry structure
% change in IDN industry share
Raising Raising Raising Raising Raising
SIC Industry description log(H/L)i log(K/L)i FINDEV LEGAL FLEX
20 Food products 12.7 −18.3 −14.3 −45.6 −14.0
21 Tobacco products 20.0 −20.8 −48.8 −59.4 −16.4
22 Textile mills products −19.3 −19.8 −6.0 −47.4 −11.1
23 Apparel −10.2 −30.2 −23.3 −47.0 −16.2
24 Wood products −2.6 −24.2 −6.8 −58.3 −13.8
25 Furniture −19.4 −15.5 −9.3 −23.3 −6.3
26 Paper products −7.9 −3.1 −12.4 −23.4 −7.0
27 Printing 26.7 3.5 −25.9 16.8 0.8
28 Chemical products 21.8 26.5 31.1 32.4 6.4
29 Petroleum refining 16.1 −2.3 −12.2 −41.4 −7.1
30 Rubber and misc plastics −15.2 −6.5 −9.0 −17.8 −5.3
31 Leather products −3.6 −29.5 −41.1 −50.7 −18.6
32 Stone, clay, glass, concrete −9.6 −0.4 −5.4 −10.9 −7.5
33 Primary metal industries −18.5 4.6 −11.5 −9.0 3.0
34 Fabricated metal products −8.2 −5.9 −16.8 −14.8 −0.6
35 Machinery and computers 7.1 20.7 29.1 43.2 18.1
36 Electronic products −13.1 13.5 30.4 41.1 19.5
37 Transportation equipment 3.4 9.8 −10.7 17.8 1.4
38 Instruments 20.4 30.1 73.8 113.7 27.1
39 Misc manufacturing −10.6 4.1 6.1 13.6 18.5
Correlation with: log(H/L)k log(K/L)k CAPDEP HI SV OL
0.69*** 0.34 0.93*** 0.74*** 0.43*
COMPL RS
0.46** 0.47***
COMPL
0.88***
Notes: Policy experiments considered involve raising each of IDN’s country characteristics to the maximum level in the
sample. The log(H/L)i column jointly raises the human capital endowment for both the interactions involving log(H/L)
k
and COMPL. The LEGAL column jointly raises the legal institutions index for all three of the interactions involving HI,
RS and COMPL. The percentage change of each industry’s output as a share of total IDN production is reported. The
bottom of the table reports the Pearson linear correlations between the percentage changes and the corresponding industry
characteristic(s); ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All percentages are calculated
as 100 ln(x′/x), where x′ and x are the final and initial values respectively.
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Appendix Table 1A
Summary of Country Characteristics
Min. 10th 25th Med. 75th 90th Max. Std. Dev.
log(H/L)i 0.072 0.257 0.392 0.592 0.807 1.039 1.215 0.290
log(K/L)i 5.763 7.050 8.332 9.723 10.828 11.318 11.589 1.584
Financial Devt. (FINDEV ) 0.007 0.100 0.157 0.279 0.515 0.790 1.378 0.296
Legal Quality (LEGAL) 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.5 0.67 0.79 0.83 0.185
Labor Mkt. Flexibility (FLEX) 0.225 0.39 0.49 0.615 0.76 0.87 1 0.184
Appendix Table 1B
Pairwise Correlation of Country Characteristics
log(H/L)i log(K/L)i FINDEV LEGAL
log(K/L)i 0.81***
FINDEV 0.58*** 0.66***
LEGAL 0.69*** 0.63*** 0.68***
FLEX 0.34*** 0.28** 0.21* 0.23**
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
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Appendix Table 2A
Summary of Manufacturing Industry Characteristics
(20 industries, SIC-87 2-digit level)
Min. 10th 25th Med. 75th 90th Max. Std. Dev.
Skill intensity (log(H/L)k) −1.971 −1.906 −1.576 −1.395 −1.082 −0.831 −0.759 0.370
Capital intensity (log(K/L)k) 2.316 2.891 3.499 3.906 4.589 5.071 6.127 0.884
Ext. Capital Dep. (CAPDEP ) −1.206 −0.751 −0.148 −0.028 0.165 0.587 0.941 0.498
Input Concentration (HI) 0.724 0.783 0.794 0.834 0.908 0.932 0.943 0.064
Input Relationship-Spec. (RS) 0.594 0.673 0.818 0.946 0.969 0.988 0.991 0.125
Job Complexity (COMPL) 0.148 0.153 0.311 0.384 0.615 0.732 1 0.221
Sales Volatility (SV OL) 0.124 0.130 0.144 0.152 0.179 0.198 0.219 0.026
Appendix Table 2B
Pairwise Correlation of Manufacturing Industry Characteristics
(20 industries, SIC-87 2-digit level)
log(H/L)k log(K/L)k CAPDEP HI RS COMPL
log(K/L)k 0.39*
CAPDEP 0.52** 0.10
HI 0.46** −0.34 0.63***
RS 0.09 −0.54** 0.13 0.55**
COMPL 0.82*** 0.19 0.65*** 0.54** 0.21
SV OL −0.08 0.06 0.38* 0.11 −0.20 0.07
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Appendix Table 3A
List of Country and Industry Groups for SMM Estimation
Exporter Groups: (Grouped by total export volumes)
Group 1: TCD; MLI; TGO; BDI; MWI; CAF; NIC; UGA; SLE; NER; MDG; BOL; SYR; SLV; HTI;
PRY; JOR; PNG; SEN; NGA; HND; GHA; ZWE; CMR; KEN; GTM (< US$1, 000, 000)
Group 2: JAM; ZMB; IRN; CRI; ECU; CIV; LKA; EGY; URY; ZAR; PAN; DOM; PER; TUN; COL;
PAK; MAR (> US$1, 000, 000 and < US$5, 000, 000)
Group 3: DZA; HUN; CHL; GRC; VEN; NZL; POL; PHL; ZAF; ARG; TUR; ISR
(> US$5, 000, 000 and < US$10, 000, 000)
Group 4: IND; IDN; PRT; NOR; THA; AUS; IRL; FIN; MYS; BRA; MEX; DNK; SGP; AUT; CHN;
ESP; KOR; SWE; CHE (> US$10, 000, 000 and < US$90, 000, 000)
Group 5: CAN; BEL; NLD; GBR; ITA; FRA; JPN; USA; DEU (> US$90, 000, 000)
SIC Industry Groups: (Grouped by total trade volumes)
Group 1: 21; 27; 25; 31; 32; 24 (< US$50, 000, 000)
Group 2: 30; 29; 22; 39; 26; 23; 34; 38; 33; 20 (> US$50, 000, 000 and < US$200, 000, 000)
Group 3: 36; 28; 37; 35 (> US$200, 000, 000)
Appendix Table 3B
Comparison of Data Moments and Matched Simulated Moments
Data moment Matched moment
(based on ΘˆSMM )
Regression coefficients:
βd1: Log (Distance) −1.16085 −1.16066
βd2: Common Language 0.50195 0.50212
βd3: Colony 0.76554 0.76529
βd4: Border 0.18948 0.18979
βd5: RTA 0.29025 0.29092
βd6: GATT 0.21723 0.21572
βf1: log(H/L)
k × log(H/L)i 1.24570 1.24543
βf2: log(K/L)
k × log(K/L)i 0.16413 0.16408
βlm1: CAPDEP × FINDEV 1.27883 1.27978
βlm2: HI × LEGAL 14.30727 14.30744
βlm3: RS × LEGAL 9.63769 9.63810
βlm4: COMPL × LEGAL 2.91853 2.91879
βlm5: COMPL × log(H/L) 1.46171 1.46231
βlm6: SV OL × FLEX 9.04316 9.04320
Trade shares:
Exporter Group 2: 0.01398 0.01400
Exporter Group 3 0.03829 0.03833
Exporter Group 4 0.23768 0.23812
Exporter Group 5 0.70615 0.70660
SIC Group 2 0.41362 0.41393
SIC Group 3 0.51905 0.51933
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Figure 1 
Assessing the Goodness of Fit: Predicted vs Actual Country GDPs 
(normalized, US=1) 
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Notes:  Actual GDP levels on the horizontal axis are from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The predicted country GDPs on the vertical axis are 
computed based on the SMM estimates. US GDP is normalized to 1. Both axes are on a log-scale. The 45-degree line is plotted for reference. The Pearson 
correlation between the two log-income variables is 0.58, while the Spearman rank correlation is 0.54, both significant at the 1% level. 
 
Figure 2 
Assessing the Goodness of Fit: Predicted vs Actual Trade Flows 
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Notes:  Actual trade flows plotted on the horizontal axis are from Feenstra et al. (2005), concorded to 2-digit SIC-87 industrial groups. Predicted trade flows 
on the vertical axis are generated from the model using the SMM estimates. Both axes employ a log-scale; the original units are in thousands of 
current (1990) US dollars. The log-linear regression line is illustrated (slope = 0.22, significant at the 1% level).   
 
 
Figure 3 
Counterfactual I: The Effects of Reducing Distance Barriers 
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Notes: Welfare effects (measured on the left vertical axis) are illustrated for two countries: Zimbabwe (ZWE), the 25th percentile per capita 
income country in the sample, and Spain (ESP), the 75th percentile country. The decline in industry concentration (Herfindahl index of 
producer shares in each industry; mean across industries) is plotted by the solid curve (measured on the right vertical axis). The smooth curves 
drawn are based on locally weighted regressions.  
Figure 4 
Counterfactual II: Correlating Welfare Changes against Initial Country Positions 
 
A: Human capital, log(H/L)k × log(H/L)i     B: Physical capital, log(K/L)
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C: Financial Development, CAPDEP × FINDEV    D:  Legal Institutions, RS × LEGAL 
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Notes: In each panel, I plot the welfare change from neutralizing the source of comparative advantage in question country-by-country. This is plotted against the initial 
value of the corresponding country characteristic. A linear regression line is added in each plot (each slope coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level). 
Figure 5 
Counterfactual III: Shift in Industry Composition for Indonesia 
 
A: Human capital, log(H/L)i       B: Physical capital, log(K/L)i  
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
-
2
0
-
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
I
D
N
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
a
r
e
,
 
%
-2 -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1 -.8
log(H/L)^k
   
20
2122
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
-
3
0
-
2
0
-
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
I
D
N
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
h
a
r
e
,
 
%
2 3 4 5 6
log(K/L)^k
 
 
C: Financial Development, FINDEV      D:  Legal Institutions, LEGAL 
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Notes: The vertical axis plots the percent change in each industry’s share of Indonesia’s manufacturing output following each counterfactual exercise of raising a country 
characteristic for Indonesia to the world frontier (the highest value observed in the sample), as described in Section 5.3. This is plotted against the corresponding industry 
characteristic. A linear best fit line is illustrated; in each panel, the slope is statistically significant at the 1% level (robust standard errors), except in panel B where it is 
marginally insignificant at the 10% level.  
